Summary: In EPC Constructions India Ltd. v. Matix Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., the Supreme Court addressed whether holders of non-cumulative redeemable preference shares can initiate insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, as financial creditors. The Court held that preference shareholders are not creditors and cannot trigger insolvency proceedings, as preference shares remain part of the share capital even upon maturity, and conversion of debt into preference shares permanently extinguishes the original creditor relationship.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”), was enacted to inter alia provide a consolidated framework to resolve insolvency in a time-bound manner and to maximise the value of assets. This objective is further aided by a moratorium under Section 14 that halts legal proceedings against the corporate debtor, and the immunity provision under Section 32A, which offers a fresh slate to resolution applicants upon plan approval.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code”), has marked a significant shift in India’s corporate insolvency landscape, transitioning from a debtor-centric approach to a creditor-centric approach. With the committee of creditors (“CoC”) now driving the resolution process, it has become imperative for “related parties”, likely to sabotage the resolution process of a corporate debtor, to be excluded from the same.

The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (“NCLAT”), has clarified and resolved the ambiguity surrounding the question of jurisdiction of the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) to entertain insolvency applications against personal guarantors where no corporate insolvency resolution process (“CIRP”) is pending against the corporate debtor. The issue was addressed through a recent judgment dated January 23, 2025, in Anita Goyal vs. Vistra ITCL (India) Ltd.

Recently, in State Bank of India v. India Power Corporation Ltd., Civil Appeal 10424 of 2024, the Hon’ble Supreme Court adjudicated upon the issue of certified copy of Order that is filed along with the appeal. 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court analysed several provisions of NCLT Rules and NCLAT Rules and held as follows:

i) Both the certified copy submitted free of cost as well as the certified copy which is made available on payment of cost are treated as “certified copies” for the purpose of Rule 50 of NCLT Rules.

Deal structure matters, particularly in bankruptcy. The Third Circuit recently ruled that a creditor’s right to future royalty payments in a non-executory contract could be discharged in the counterparty-debtor’s bankruptcy. The decision highlights the importance of properly structuring M&A, earn-out, and royalty-based transactions to ensure creditors receive the benefit of their bargain — even (or especially) if their counterparty later encounters financial distress.

Background

In early February, a Delaware bankruptcy judge set new precedent by granting a creditors’ committee derivative standing to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims against a Delaware LLC’s members and officers. At least three prior Delaware Bankruptcy Court decisions had held that creditors were barred from pursuing such derivative claims by operation of Delaware state law, specifically under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the “DLLCA”).

A Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court’s recent appellate decision in Blumsack v. Harrington (In re Blumsack) leaves the door open for those employed in the cannabis industry to seek bankruptcy relief where certain conditions are met.

It is a rare occasion that one can be assured with certainty that, if they file a motion with a bankruptcy court, it will be granted. But, in the Third Circuit, that is exactly what will happen if a creditor or other party in interest moves for an examiner to be appointed under Section 1104(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. Once considered to be within the discretion of a bankruptcy court “as is appropriate,” the appointment of an examiner is now guaranteed if the statutory predicates are fulfilled according to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Advice that may have served House of Pain in their 1992 hit song, “Jump Around,” to “bring a shotgun” to battle likely does not translate well to plaintiffs in federal litigation contemplating bringing a “shotgun” pleading to court. In this article we explore types of shotgun pleadings identified by courts and outline potential responses to a shotgun pleading.

Shotgun Pleadings and Relationship to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure