Imagine you are the CEO of company sitting across from an interviewer. The interviewer asks you the age old question, “So tell me about your company’s strengths and weaknesses?” You start thinking about your competitive advantages that distinguish you from competitors. You decide to talk about how you know your customers better than the competition, including who they are, what they need, and how your products and services fit their needs and desires. The interviewer, being somewhat cynical, asks “Aren’t you worried about the liabilities involved with collecting all that data?”

A recent opinion issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reminds us that corporate veil-piercing liability is not exclusive to shareholders. Anyone who is in control of and misuses the corporate structure can be found liable for the obligations of the corporation. The facts of this case, however, did not support personal liability for veil-piecing.

In an earlier blog piece we reported on the Third Circuit’s 2015 decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp. where the Court approved a settlement, implemented through a structured dismissal, which allowed junior creditors to receive a distribution prior to senior creditors being paid in full.

Today’s U.S. Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trustputs an end to one of Puerto Rico’s multi-pronged efforts to deleverage itself.

On April 15, 2016, the IRS released a generic legal advice memorandum (GLAM 2016-001) (the “April GLAM”) addressing the impact of so-called “bad boy” guarantees (also known as nonrecourse carve-out guarantees) on the characterization of underlying partnership debt as recourse vs. nonrecourse under Section 752 of the Internal Revenue Code.

There have been a number of recent instances, including this year, of quoted companies calling general meetings to seek shareholder approval to remedy dividends that were paid unlawfully. Invariably these have been for non-compliance with a statutory formality rather than because the company did not have sufficient distributable profits to make the dividend.

Why are companies prepared to suffer the embarrassment and expense of going to their shareholders to fix the breach rather than simply doing nothing?

Shareholders who received nearly $8 billion from the Tribune Company leveraged buyout (LBO) do not have to give back that money as a constructive fraudulent transfer. Although the possibility remains that the creditors can recover this money through the pending intentional fraudulent transfer claims, which are much more difficult to prove, the Second Circuit recently held that the Bankruptcy Code preempts creditors from recovering under state constructive fraud theories when shareholders receive distributions under securities contracts effectuated through financial institutions.

A recent bankruptcy court decision from the influential Southern District of New York permitted a debtor to reject executory contracts with midstream gathers as an exercise of sound business judgment. In In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation, the court issued an advisory ruling in which it determined that certain provisions of the rejected contracts were not covenants that ran with the land, and thus could be rejected thereby relieving the debtor of a financial hardship.

The Court of Appeal has reiterated some important rules for funders involved in debt purchase. Banking Litigation specialist Alasdair Urwin looks at the recent case of Bibby Factors Northwest v HDF and MCD [1].

Buyer beware

This case concerned a factoring agreement, pursuant to which a funder (Bibby) purchased unpaid invoices from another company (the Assignor), including debts owing from the defendant companies (the Customers).

A few thoughts on Tuesday’s oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in the litigation over whether Puerto Rico’s Public Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, an insolvency statute for certain of its government instrumentalities, is void, as the lower federal courts held, under Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code: