A New York bankruptcy court recently rejected a debtor’s challenge to a consensual state court judgment (“Judgment”) in favor of mortgagee, General Electric Capital Corporation (“GECC”), that had accelerated a debt and obtained a prepetition foreclosure judgment against debtor, 410 East 92nd Street (the “Hotel”), in the amount of approximately $74 million. In re: Madison 92nd St. Associates LLC, 472 B.R. 189 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).

Since it was decided in June 2011, countless scholars and courts have weighed in on the impact and implications of the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in Stern v. Marshall.

Officials from Abound Solar Manufacturing told the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs, Stimulus Oversight, and Government Spending July 18 that inexpensive solar panel imports from China led the manufacturer to file for bankruptcy July 2 after receiving a Department of Energy loan guarantee. The company had drawn down $70 million of the $400 million loan guarantee.

The Department of Energy announced June 28 that Abound Solar Manufacturing LLC, a Colorado-based manufacturer of thin film solar panels and recipient of a $400 million loan guarantee, plans to stop operations this week, making it the fourth company backed by the Department of Energy’s loan guarantee program to file for bankruptcy. The company received a loan guarantee in December 2010 to help fund construction of two commercial-scale plants.

The secured lender industry experienced a collective sigh of relief on May 29 after the Supreme Court ruled in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al. v. Amalgamated Bank that credit bidding remains a viable option to protect collateral in a cramdown bankruptcy plan. Expressly inscribed in Sections 363(k) and 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, credit bidding has long been understood as a fairly uncontroversial right; until recently.

The Delaware bankruptcy court in the KB Toys, Inc. cases recently held that a claims purchaser takes a claim subject to certain disabilities of the claim as held by the seller, regardless of whether the claim transfer is deemed a “sale” or an “assignment.” SeeIn re KB Toys, Inc., Case No. 04-10120 (KJC) (Bankr. Del. May 4, 2012). In so ruling, the Delaware court’s decision is somewhat at odds with the decision issued by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in the Enron bankruptcy cases. See Enron Corp. v.

After several years of unusually few corporate defaults, there has recently been an uptick in corporations failing to satisfy their bond and loan obligations. In a number of cases, the debts in question are part of multiple-lien or multi-tranche financing structures that incorporate complex subordination packages. The agreements at issue often go beyond merely subordinating rights to payments.

It is common for lenders to require borrowers to agree to pay a higher interest rate, known as the default rate, following an event of default under a loan. Some loan agreements also require the borrower to pay a fee in the event of a late payment. If the borrower files for bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code affords special protection to secured creditors with respect to collecting interest.

It is common knowledge that the Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with a “fresh start” by allowing it to discharge prepetition claims. Similarly, section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee or debtor in possession to sell property of the estate “free and clear” of prior claims. These two concepts, while relatively straightforward, raise a fundamental question — when does a creditor hold a “claim” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code?

In the 2010 decision of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d. Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a plan proponent could deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid on its collateral when the sale was made pursuant to a plan of reorganization. That holding was a surprise to many given that secured creditors were specifically authorized to credit bid in stand-alone sales under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A year or so later, another circuit court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, came to the opposite conclusion.