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Transfers and transactions up to ten years old may be scrutinized, unwound and recovered by a trustee, the bankruptcy court sitting in Massachusetts recently held in the NECCO (think chalky wafer candy) bankruptcy case. The ruling, in a case of first impression in Massachusetts, expands the reach back period from the typical four-year period for fraudulent transfer recovery, so long as the IRS is a creditor in the case.

This past May, in a highly-anticipated decision, the Supreme Court held in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code has the same effect as a breach of contract outside of bankruptcy.

Over the last two years, much of the healthcare world has been watching the government’s prosecution of Insys Therapeutics for its sales and marketing practices related to its Subsys spray. Subsys is powerful and highly addictive fentanyl spray (administered under the tongue) that was approved by the FDA in 2012 for the treatment of persistent breakthrough pain in adult cancer patients who were already receiving, and tolerant to, regular opioid therapy.

On May 20, 2019, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a debtor-licensor’s ‘rejection’ of a trademark license agreement under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code does not terminate the licensee’s rights to continue to use the trademark. The decision, issued in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, resolved a split among the Circuits, but may spawn additional issues regarding non-debtor contractual rights in bankruptcy.

The Court Tells Debtors, “No Take Backs”

On May 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an 8-1 ruling in the case of Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC. The decision resolves a circuit split, holding that a licensee may retain its right to use licensed trademarks, notwithstanding the debtor-licensor’s rejection of the contract in bankruptcy. The Supreme Court’s decision has potentially far-reaching implications.

In normal circumstances, a director’s primary duty (owed to the company, not the company’s shareholders or the corporate group) is to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders as a whole. When a company enters a period of financial distress (the so-called “zone of insolvency”) there is a shift of emphasis in the duties of the directors: directors must consider the interests of the company’s creditors and, depending on the extent of the financial distress, may need to prioritise such interests over those of its members.

When a company enters a period of financial distress, directors must consider the interests of the company’s creditors and, depending on the extent of the financial distress, may need to prioritise such interests over those of its members. In such distressed situations, the key current heads of liability directors may face (for which they may potentially incur personal liabilities) include wrongful trading, fraudulent trading, misfeasance and breach of duty.

On April 23, 2019, Ropes & Gray, representing a large group of shareholder defendants, won a decision in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York that provides potential fraudulent transfer protection for payments made to shareholders in leveraged buyouts, stock redemptions and other securities transactions.

Constructive Fraudulent Transfer Claims and the Securities Safe Harbor

Tolstoy warned that “if you look for perfection, you’ll never be content”; but Tolstoy wasn’t a bankruptcy lawyer. In the world of secured lending, perfection is paramount. A secured lender that has not properly perfected its lien can lose its collateral and end up with unsecured status if its borrower files bankruptcy.

In its ruling in FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Sweeney (In re Centaur, LLC), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed the Supreme Court’s recent clarification of the scope of Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e)’s “safe harbor” provision, affirming a more narrow interpretation of Section 546(e).