It is not unusual for a creditor of a debtor to cry foul that a non-debtor affiliate has substantial assets, but has not joined the bankruptcy. In some cases, the creditor may assert that even though its claim, on its face, is solely against the debtor, the debtor and the non-debtor conducted business as a single unit, or that the debtor indicated that the assets of the non-debtor were available to satisfy claims. In these circumstances, the creditor would like nothing more than to drag that asset-rich non-debtor into the bankruptcy to satisfy its claims. Is that possible?

In Lagos v. United States, 584 U.S. ___ (2018), the Supreme Court issued a unanimous ruling that limits the ability of corporate victims of fraud to seek reimbursement of legal fees for internal investigations. The case began when GE Capital discovered that Sergio Lagos falsified numerous invoices for his company, which he used as collateral to obtain tens of millions of dollars in loans from GE Capital.

Bankruptcies and other debt restructuring activities for health care providers are on the rise, and recent headlines related to the industry suggest further stormy weather ahead. Please join Dykema attorneys Mark Andrews and Lea Courington as they discuss the intersection of healthcare and insolvency. What is the current state of the industry? Why are nursing homes, hospitals and other healthcare institutions in financial trouble? What factors are changing reimbursement rates? What effect does litigation have on the success or failure of the nursing home industry?

The Supreme Court recently addressed two bankruptcy issues. In its opinion, the Court resolved a circuit split regarding the breadth of the safe harbor provision which protects certain transfers by financial institutions in connection with a securities contract. In Village at Lakeridge, the Court weighed in on the scope of appellate review and whether a bankruptcy court’s factual determination should be reviewed for clear error or de novo. These decisions are notable because they provide guidance on previously murky issues of bankruptcy law.

Judge Swain’s decision in the PROMESA Title III bankruptcy proceeding of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”) that a federal bankruptcy court cannot compel a municipal debtor to apply special revenues to post-petition debt service payments on special revenue bonds has generated controversy and caused some market participants to question whether, if the decision is upheld by the First Circuit on appeal, the perception that special revenue bonds have special rights in bankruptcy remains justified.

Last week, President Trump unveiled his proposal to fix our nation’s aging infrastructure. While the proposal lauded $1.5 trillion in new spending, it only included $200 billion in federal funding. To bridge this sizable gap, the plan largely relies on public private partnerships (often referred to as P3s) that can use tax-exempt bond financing.

Last week, President Trump unveiled his proposal to fix our nation’s aging infrastructure. While the proposal lauded $1.5 trillion in new spending, it only included $200 billion in federal funding. To bridge this sizable gap, the plan largely relies on public private partnerships (often referred to as P3s) that can use tax-exempt bond financing.

In the recently decided case, Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit took a hardline position that trademark license rights are not protected in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Code section 365(n) permits a licensee to continue to use intellectual property even if the debtor rejects the license agreement.

InIn Re Lexington Hospitality Group, LLC, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky thwarted a lender’s efforts to control whether its borrower could file bankruptcy. As a condition to the loan, the lender mandated that the borrower’s operating agreement have certain provisions that require the affirmative vote of an “Independent Manager” and 75% of the members to authorize a bankruptcy.

The Delaware bankruptcy court recently decided that a debtor could not assign a trademark license absent the consent of the licensor. The court concluded that federal trademark law and the terms of the license precluded assignment without consent. Because the debtor could not assign the license under any circumstances (consent was not forthcoming), the court held that cause existed to annul the automatic stay to permit the licensor to “move on with its trademark and its business.”