Last week, President Trump unveiled his proposal to fix our nation’s aging infrastructure. While the proposal lauded $1.5 trillion in new spending, it only included $200 billion in federal funding. To bridge this sizable gap, the plan largely relies on public private partnerships (often referred to as P3s) that can use tax-exempt bond financing.

In the recently decided case, Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit took a hardline position that trademark license rights are not protected in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Code section 365(n) permits a licensee to continue to use intellectual property even if the debtor rejects the license agreement.

A super-priority debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lender with a lien on all of the debtor’s assets has no “better claim” to a Chapter 11’s debtor’s leased property than the lessor, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Jan. 11, 2018.Banco Panamericano, Inc. v. City of Peoria, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 738, *12 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 2018). According to the court, the “lease between [the debtor] and [the lessor] gave [the debtor] no post-termination property interest” in “installations or structures” on the debtor’s property.Id.

“[T]he largely debt-financed purchase of a family-owned [business] was not a fraudulent [transfer] and did not amount to a violation of the fiduciary duty of the company’s directors,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on Dec. 4, 2017. In re Irving Tanning Co., 2017 W.L. 5988834, *1 (1st Cir. Dec. 4, 2017).

“[T]he Bankruptcy Code does not permit [an undersecured] creditor . . . to advance an unsecured claim for post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees,” held the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on Nov. 27, 2017. Summitbridge Nat’l Invs. Iii v. Faison, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195267, *8 (E.D. N. C. Nov. 27, 2017). Affirming the bankruptcy court, the district court agreed that “the Code is most properly interpreted to allow only oversecured creditors to add post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees.” Id., at *10.

“[B]ankruptcy does not constitute a per se breach of contract and does not excuse performance by the other party in the absence of some further indication that the [debtor] either cannot, or does not, intend to perform,” held the Supreme Court of Connecticut in a lengthy opinion on Nov. 21, 2017. CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc., 2017 WL 5477540, *13 (Ct. Nov. 21, 2017) (en banc), superseding 324 Conn. 654, 153 A.3d 1249 (2017). Reversing the trial court, granting the plaintiff’s motion for en banc reconsideration of its earlier Feb.

“Officers and directors of [an operating corporate debtor] have fiduciary duties to the corporation — not the corporation’s creditors” under Texas law, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Oct. 27, 2017. In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21337, *7 (5th Cir. Oct. 27, 2017). In affirming the district court’s dismissal of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee’s complaint, the Fifth Circuit rejected the trustee’s breach of fiduciary claims against officers and directors for permitting “the payment of . . .

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently dismissed an appeal from “the sale of legal claims” as “statutorily moot” under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(m) because the appellants “had not obtained a stay” of the effectiveness of the sale order pending appeal. In re Pursuit Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 20889 (3d Cir. Oct. 24, 2017). According to the court, “we cannot give [the appellants] the remedy they seek without affecting the validity of the sale.” Id., at *37.

Relevance

InIn Re Lexington Hospitality Group, LLC, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky thwarted a lender’s efforts to control whether its borrower could file bankruptcy. As a condition to the loan, the lender mandated that the borrower’s operating agreement have certain provisions that require the affirmative vote of an “Independent Manager” and 75% of the members to authorize a bankruptcy.

The Delaware bankruptcy court recently decided that a debtor could not assign a trademark license absent the consent of the licensor. The court concluded that federal trademark law and the terms of the license precluded assignment without consent. Because the debtor could not assign the license under any circumstances (consent was not forthcoming), the court held that cause existed to annul the automatic stay to permit the licensor to “move on with its trademark and its business.”