Since the introduction of The Companies Act 2014, directors have relied on the Summary Approval Procedure as a means of sanctioning certain activities that are otherwise prohibited.

While it has been a welcome development in simplifying financial transactions, directors need to be mindful of the appropriate steps to be taken so they are not leaving themselves open to committing an offence or being personally liable for the debts of a company.

Background

On March 5, 2018, the Federal Maritime Commission voted to launch an investigation into the detention, demurrage, and per diem charges of vessel operating common carriers and marine terminal operators. The investigation will be headed by Commissioner Rebecca Dye, who will have broad authority to issue subpoenas, hold public and non-public inquiries, and require reports.

The key issues Commissioner Dye will investigate are:

The High Court has refused a challenge by a liquidator to an invoice discounting agreement entered into by the Company prior to liquidation.

The liquidator argued that the invoice discounting agreement was in fact a loan agreement under which the Bank took a charge over the Company’s book debts. If that was the case, then those funds would be funds in the liquidation and the Bank an unsecured creditor, because the loan agreement was not registered and therefore void as against the liquidator.

The High Court recently rejected an appeal by KBC Bank Ireland (“KBC”) to write down a portion of a debtor couple’s mortgage due to the uncertainty in the ability of the debtors to repay the warehousing portion of the loan. The Personal Insolvency Arrangement (“PIA”) which had been approved by the Circuit Court was upheld.

SNDA Basics

A subordination, nondisturbance and attornment agreement (“SNDA”) is commonly used in real estate financing to clarify the rights and obligations between the owner of rental property (i.e., the borrower), the lender that provides financing secured by the property, and the tenant under a lease of the property in the event the lender forecloses or otherwise acquires title to the property. As suggested by its name, an SNDA has the following three primary components:

A recent High Court case has brought about a change in the status quo involving personal insolvency arrangements and separated spouses. Banks were previously unable to complete deals with one spouse without the mutual cooperation of both parties. However the decision of JD & Personal Insolvency Acts1 has altered this position.

The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1

What is a Structured Dismissal?

The new Companies Ordinance (Cap 622) enacted in 2012 was the first part of the effort to rewrite the statutory provisions relating to the incorporation and operation of companies. The remaining task of updating the winding up and insolvency provisions was completed in May 2016, when amendments to the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32) (CWUMPO) were passed into law. Although the implementation date of these amendments are to be announced by the government, it is time to look at the significant changes ahead.

The proposed bankruptcy sale of Golfsmith International Holdings to Dick’s Sporting Goods was recently approved, after the privacy ombudsman recommended that almost 10,000,000 consumer records (i.e., the personal information of consumers) of Golfsmith International Holdings can be transferred to Dick’s Sporting Goods.

Nearly four years after its decision in Stern v. Marshall raised new doubts about the place of bankruptcy courts in our legal system, the Supreme Court has finally put those doubts to rest. This week, in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, the Court held that even for claims that must otherwise be resolved by an Article III court, a bankruptcy court may still adjudicate the matter based on consent.