The Supreme Court recently limited the ability of debtors to use contract rejection in bankruptcy to shed unwanted trademark licensees. But the Court acknowledged that the result could change if the trademark licensing agreement had different termination rights. Going forward, parties entering into trademark licensing agreements will need to consider this decision carefully as they negotiate termination rights in the event of a bankruptcy by the licensor.

In Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Tempnology LLC, No. 17-1657, the Supreme Court has held that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract does not abrogate the rights others enjoy under that contract. Although the Court’s ruling specifically dealt with rights to a trademark license, the reasoning appears broader than that. The Supreme Court has in effect done away with a debtor’s right to reject any lease, concession, license, or agreement and then prevent a counterparty from enjoying the use of the rights previously granted.

With the May 1 order, the Commission reaffirms its view that it has concurrent jurisdiction over debtors’ efforts to reject their FERC-jurisdictional contracts in bankruptcy. Further developments in judicial proceedings in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits are expected.

On May 1, 2019, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission denied Pacific Gas and Electric Co.’s requests for rehearing of two commission orders asserting concurrent jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts over the disposition of wholesale power contracts PG&E seeks to reject through bankruptcy.[1]

On March 5, 2018, the Federal Maritime Commission voted to launch an investigation into the detention, demurrage, and per diem charges of vessel operating common carriers and marine terminal operators. The investigation will be headed by Commissioner Rebecca Dye, who will have broad authority to issue subpoenas, hold public and non-public inquiries, and require reports.

The key issues Commissioner Dye will investigate are:

SNDA Basics

A subordination, nondisturbance and attornment agreement (“SNDA”) is commonly used in real estate financing to clarify the rights and obligations between the owner of rental property (i.e., the borrower), the lender that provides financing secured by the property, and the tenant under a lease of the property in the event the lender forecloses or otherwise acquires title to the property. As suggested by its name, an SNDA has the following three primary components:

The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1

What is a Structured Dismissal?

The new Companies Ordinance (Cap 622) enacted in 2012 was the first part of the effort to rewrite the statutory provisions relating to the incorporation and operation of companies. The remaining task of updating the winding up and insolvency provisions was completed in May 2016, when amendments to the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32) (CWUMPO) were passed into law. Although the implementation date of these amendments are to be announced by the government, it is time to look at the significant changes ahead.

The proposed bankruptcy sale of Golfsmith International Holdings to Dick’s Sporting Goods was recently approved, after the privacy ombudsman recommended that almost 10,000,000 consumer records (i.e., the personal information of consumers) of Golfsmith International Holdings can be transferred to Dick’s Sporting Goods.

Nearly four years after its decision in Stern v. Marshall raised new doubts about the place of bankruptcy courts in our legal system, the Supreme Court has finally put those doubts to rest. This week, in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, the Court held that even for claims that must otherwise be resolved by an Article III court, a bankruptcy court may still adjudicate the matter based on consent.