Section 42 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (“BO”) provides that where a person is adjudged bankrupt, any disposition of property made by that person from the date of presentation of the bankruptcy petition is void unless made with the consent of the Court or unless subsequently ratified by the Court. The purpose of this section is to prevent the improper dissipation of the bankrupt’s assets once a bankruptcy petition is filed and to protect the principle of pari passu distribution.

In In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, No. 14-97-bk(L), 2015 WL 727965 (2d Cir. Feb.

Section 30A(1) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (the “BO”), provides that the bankruptcy period, for a person who has been adjudged bankrupt for the first time, runs for four years. However, section 30A(4) of the BO provides eight grounds upon which the Court, on the application of the trustee in bankruptcy or a creditor, can order the suspension of a bankruptcy period – in effect lengthening the period of bankruptcy.

In Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin, C.A. No. 6990-VCL, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 193 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2014), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that when creditors of insolvent firms assert derivative claims, they need not meet the contemporaneous ownership requirement applied to stockholder-plaintiffs.

A bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania recently held that trade creditors who supplied goods to a debtor prior to its bankruptcy filing were not entitled to administrative priority status under Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(9) because the goods were “received by the debtor” at the time they were placed on the vessel at the port overseas more than 20 days before the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, although the debtor took possession of the goods within the 20 day period.  In re World Imports, Ltd. — B.R. —-, 2014 WL 2750258 (Bankr. E.D. Pa., June 18, 2014).

A bankrupt can be required to pay a portion of his income earned during the bankruptcy to his or her trustees by way of a contribution to the bankrupt estate. Such payments can be fixed by the court pursuant to section 43E of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap 6 of the Laws of Hong Kong) or agreed between the bankrupt and the trustees on an informal basis, and are calculated after assessing the bankrupt's reasonable expenses.

This is a case with respect to the interpretation of the words "the applicant's entitlement to severance payment" in section 16(2)(f)(i) of the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance (the "PWIO").

Under the PWIO, the applicant may apply for an ex-gratia payment from the Protection of Wages on insolvency Fund (the "Fund") as his former employer entered into voluntary liquidation.

The relevant sections of the PWIO are set out below:-

"15(1) ......an applicant to whom:-

Successor liability is often a concern for the acquirer when purchasing substantially all of a seller’s assets.  While this risk is well known, the circumstances under which an acquirer will be found liable under the theory of successor liability are less clear.  The recent decision in Call Center Techs., Inc. v Grand Adventures Tour & Travel Pub. Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29057, 2014 WL 85934 (D. Conn. 2014), sheds helpful light on this issue by defining the continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability.

Law360, New York (March 25, 2014, 1:21 PM ET) -- On Feb. 11, the three private plaintiff-appellants and 11 state plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring et al. v. Jacob J. Lew et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the district court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

On Feb. 11, the three private plaintiff- appellants and 11 state plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring et al. v. Jacob J. Lew et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the district court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).