Equitable mootness is a judicially created doctrine often applied in appeals from orders of bankruptcy courts confirming chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In instances where granting relief on appeal would result in overturning the confirmation order and therefore unravelling a substantially consummated chapter 11 plan, appellate courts have, in certain circumstances, abstained from deciding appeals in reliance on equitable mootness.

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan cannot modify the rights of a secured creditor whose claim is only secured by an “interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” On December 6, the Eleventh Circuit held that this provision prevents the discharge of a mortgage in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, regardless of whether the plan “provided for” the mortgage or whether the mortgagee filed a proof of claim.

After Energy Future Holdings (EFH), maybe not so much. The size of the break-up fee approved by the bankruptcy court in EFH was undoubtedly large by any account – US$275 million. But it was approved following all necessary filings, notice and hearings. All parties and counsel involved were highly sophisticated and experienced. The court that approved the fee was the Delaware bankruptcy court, by all accounts one of the most experienced and sophisticated bankruptcy courts in the nation. And there wasn’t even a hint of fraud, misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts.

Shareholder of a Korean corporation (“Cuzco Korea”), the sole member of a chapter 11 limited liability company debtor (“Cuzco USA” or the “Debtor”), brought an adversary proceeding against the Debtor and others, asserting claims directly, derivatively on behalf of Cuzco Korea and “double derivatively” on behalf of the Debtor. On the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the bankruptcy court for the district of Hawaii was required to consider the impact of Korean law on the derivative claims as well as notions of forum non conveniens.

In a decision widely anticipated by investors in emerging market and distressed debt, the Court of Appeal has upheld the decision of the High Court to refuse to grant an indefinite moratorium on claims under certain English law debts under the Cross Border Insolvency Rules (“CBIR”). In doing so, the Court of Appeal has reaffirmed a long-standing principle of English common law that provides important protection to creditors; known as the Rule in Gibbs, the rule provides that a debt may only be discharged according to its own governing law.

The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (“WVCCPA”) is a remedial statute designed to protect West Virginia consumers from improper debt collection. Only “consumers” have standing to file a lawsuit under the WVCCPA. The term “consumer” is defined as a natural person that owes a debt or allegedly owes a debt. But does a person still owe debt if that debt was discharged by a bankruptcy court? Although there is some conflicting case law in West Virginia, an answer is forming.

On October 26, the Eastern District of Wisconsin issued a ruling dismissing a Fair Credit Reporting Act case. In Garland v. Marine Credit Union, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the debt collector, holding the dispute was a legal issue such that the consumer could not establish a factual inaccuracy in the credit reporting.

The Northern District of Illinois recently held that a collection letter sent to a consumer’s attorney seeking payment on a debt discharged in bankruptcy did not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act based on the “competent lawyer” standard. The case is Grajny v. Credit Control, LLC, No. 18-C-2719, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173682, 2018 WL 4905019 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2018).

On August 20, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois in In re I80 Equipment, LLC, No.17-81749, 2018 WL 4006294 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2018) held that a secured party failed to perfect its security interest due to an insufficient description of the collateral listed in its UCC-1 financing statement. The financing statement failed to sufficiently describe the collateral because it referenced the definition of “collateral” in the underlying security agreement without attaching the security agreement to the financing statement.

HERE LIONS ROAM: CISG AS THE MEASURE OF A CLAIM'S

VALUE AND VALIDITY AND A DEBTOR'S

DISCHARGEABILITY

Amir Shachmurove*

INTRODUCTION ............................................ ..... 463

I. A COMEDY OF ERRORS .............. 468

II. RELEVANT BANKRUPTCY LAW: THE CODE AND THE RULES ............ 470

A. Code and Rules .......................... ......... 470

B. Determination of a Claim 's Validity and Value .............. 471

C. Temporary Valuation Pursuant to Rule 3018(a) .... ........ 475