In many, if not all, commercial transactions, timing is everything, either for a distressed seller or a purchaser stumbling upon a deal that may almost be too good to be true. There is often no time to waste and a deal must be closed as soon as possible. In the haste of closing a deal, whether in the form of a sale of business or a sale of assets, the parties often agree not to comply with the provisions of s34(1) of the Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936 (Act), each willing to take the risk in not doing so.

Section 34(1) of the Act provides that:

It is trite that the purpose of business rescue proceedings is to rehabilitate companies that have fallen on hard times, with a hope of either rescuing them or to provide a better return to creditors than what they would receive on a liquidation. This was reiterated in the recent Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) judgment of Van Staden and Others NNO v Pro-Wiz (Pty) Ltd (412/2018) [2019] ZASCA 7 (8 March 2019).

We are all accustomed to seeing change of control as a mandatory prepayment event, if not an event of default, under subscription line facilities. Even the strongest sponsors accept that a lender’s analysis of a transaction is based on the current management of the fund, such that any change in control should trigger at least the right to prepayment and cancellation. While there are often points for negotiation, this premise is almost universal.

The Bill aims to amend, among others, the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Insolvency Act) to provide that secured creditors holding property pledged as security for the obligations of a South African party arising under a “master agreement” may:

On November 30, 2018, Judge Nelson S. Román of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision affirming the dismissal of certain claims brought by senior secured creditors against junior secured creditors concerning the alleged breach of standstill and turnover provisions in an intercreditor agreement that governed the creditors’ relationship as creditors with recourse to common collateral. SeeIn re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 15-CV-2280 (NSR), 2018 WL 6324842 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018) (“Momentive”).

On November 8, 2018, Judge Vyskocil of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision dismissing the involuntary petition that had been filed against Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. (“Taberna”), a non-recourse CDO, thus ending a nearly seventeen-month-long saga that was followed closely by bankruptcy practitioners and securitization professionals alike. SeeTaberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. v. Opportunities II Ltd., et. al., (In re Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd.), No. 17-11628 (MKV), 2018 WL 5880918, at *24 (Bankr.

We identify and explain four of the court’s key findings below:

1. “In all matters where execution is sought against a primary residence, the entire claim, including the monetary judgment, must be adjudicated at the same time”.

This brief alert is a follow-up to our previous article published on 1 February 2017, on the SCA judgment and is aimed at reporting on the Constitutional Court judgment.

The Policy

Following on from our previous tax alerts regarding the various proposed amendments pursuant to the draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2018 (draft TLAB) published for public comment on 17 July 2018, we discuss in this Tax Alert another significant proposed legislative amendment, specifically related to the allowance for doubtful debts set out in s11(j) of the Income Tax Act, No 58 of 1962 (Act). 

The Gauteng Division of the High Court recently delivered a judgment in the matter of The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and Logikal Consulting (Pty) Ltd and Others, Case No. 96768/2016, in which the court had to interpret, among other things, what comprises a “class” of creditors as contemplated in s155(2) of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008.