On August 9, 2019, in a unanimous decision (written by a former bankruptcy judge), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the confirmation of the Peabody Energy Chapter 11 plan (“Plan”)1 with a prominent backstopped rights offering component.
In this week's update: directors did not need to consider the rights of creditors when declaring a dividend as the company was not insolvent, the Law Commission is seeking views on the law of intermediated securities, polling information can be inside information and a couple of other items.
Court considers whether demerger by dividend was valid (part 4)
In this week's update: a distribution was valid despite discrepancies in the accounts justifying the dividend and an examination of vexatious resolutions.
Court considers whether demerger by dividend was valid (part 2)
In this week's update: directors implementing a management buy-out did not owe fiduciary duties to the other shareholders and a distribution was valid despite the relevant accounts not being in the usual format.
Directors did not owe fiduciary duty to shareholders
The High Court has held that the directors of a company did not owe a fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders when implementing a management buy-out (MBO).
What happened?
On June 19, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) affirmed a ruling of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (the “District Court”) dismissing challenges by certain first lien creditors of Texas Competitive Electric Holdings LLC (“TCEH”) to the plan distributions and adequate protection payments made during TCEH’s bankruptcy case.
In Mission Product Holdings, the Supreme Court Endorses “Rejection-as-Breach” Rule and Interprets Broadly the Contract Rights that Survive Rejection
Last year, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Merit, unanimously ruling that a buyout transaction between private parties did not qualify for “safe harbor” protection under Bankruptcy Code section 546(e), on the basis that a “financial institution” acted as an intermediary in the overarching transaction.
The Institutional Limited Partner Association (ILPA) has published recommendations for how “GP-led fund restructurings” should be organised. These transactions occur when a fund sponsor (GP/manager) introduces a secondary purchaser to buy assets out of one of its existing funds, typically into a new fund structure where the same GP is the manager. Such transactions are complex and inevitably throw up conflict issues. Investors regularly complain that GPs are short on transparency and slapdash with timelines when trying to do one of these deals.
On March 18, 2019, Judge Stuart M. Bernstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision enforcing a mortgage lender’s claim for a prepayment premium (a/k/a make-whole or yield maintenance premium) notwithstanding the lender’s prepetition acceleration of the loan due to the debtor’s default.
No. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s original finding, namely that no duty to consider AWA’s creditors had arisen. Whilst AWA’s directors had made provision for the contingent liabilities in question, this did not itself mean AWA was insolvent or close to insolvency. In fact, it was not, and so the duty to consider AWA’s creditors never arose.
Practical implications
Although this decision simply confirms the High Court’s original decision, it emphasises the care and vigilance with which directors of a company need to act when paying dividends.