A bankruptcy court gave "unnecessary and likely incorrect" reasoning to support its "excessively broad proposition that sales free and clear under [Bankruptcy Code ("Code")] Section 363 override, and essentially render nugatory, the critical lessee protections against a debtor-lessor under [Code] 365(h)," said the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Feb. 16, 2022. In re Royal Bistro, LLC, 2022 WL 499938, *1-*2 (5th Cir. Feb. 16, 2022).

¹ The Third Circuit also affirmed a judgment that awarded the senior creditor damages for the misapplication of such collateral proceeds in violation of the intercreditor agreement’s turnover provision.

“Good-faith purchasers enjoy strong protection under [Bankruptcy Code (“Code”)] § 363(m),” but the silent asset buyer (“B”) with “actual and constructive knowledge of a competing interest” lacks “good faith,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on April 4, 2022. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. (“ADM”) v. Country Visions Cooperative, 2022 WL 998984 (7th Cir. Apr. 4, 2022).

On March 15, 2022, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico announced that the Plan of Adjustment for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico became effecfive, more than four years aher Puerto Rico commenced restructuring proceedings under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”). PROMESA is a bespoke piece of federal legislafion enacted in 2016 to address Puerto Rico’s debt crisis, and incorporates most of chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.

A bankruptcy court gave “unnecessary and unlikely incorrect” reasoning to support its “excessively broad proposition that sales free and clear under [Bankruptcy Code (“Code”)] Section 363 override, and essentially render nugatory, the critical lessee protections against a debtor-lessor under [Code] 365(h),” said the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Feb. 16, 2022. In re Royal Bistro, LLC, 2022 WL 499938, *1-*2 (5th Cir. Feb. 16, 2022).

For the second time in four weeks, a U.S. district court questioned the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue nonconsensual third-party releases as part of a plan of reorganization.

For the second time in four weeks, a U.S. District Court has questioned the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue non-consensual third-party releases as part of a plan of reorganization. On Jan. 13, 2022, the Eastern District of Virginia vacated the confirmation order in the Mahwah Bergen Retail Group, Inc. (f/k/a Ascena Retail Group, Inc.) chapter 11 cases on the grounds that the plan contained impermissible non-consensual third-party releases. Patterson, et al. v. Mahwah Bergen Retail Group, Inc., Civ. No. 3:21cv167 (DJN) (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2022).

On December 22, 2021, Judge Mary Walrath of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held in In re The Hertz Corp. that redemption premiums may potentially qualify as unmatured interest, and that, to the extent that such redemption premiums are unmatured interest on unsecured debt, then creditors would only be entitled to receive the federal judgment rate, not the contractual rate of interest.

Appeals from bankruptcy court orders continue to play a key role in bankruptcy practice. The relevant sections of the Judicial Code and the Federal Bankruptcy Rules arguably cover all the relevant issues in a straightforward manner. Recent cases, however, show that neither Congress nor the Rules Committees could ever address the myriad issues raised by imaginative lawyers. The appellate courts continue to wrestle with standing, jurisdiction, mootness, excusable neglect, and finality, among other things.

A “federal [fraudulent transfer claim under Bankruptcy Code § 548] is independent of [a] state-court [foreclosure] judgment,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on Dec. 27, 2021. In reLowry, 2021 WL 6112972, *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 2021). Reversing the lower courts’ approval of a Michigan tax foreclosure sale, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that “the amount paid on foreclosure bore no relation at all to the value of the property, thus precluding the … argument that the sale was for ‘a reasonably equivalent value’ under the rule of BFP v.