Recent piece-meal amendments to the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003 seem to have cumulated into a restructuring solution that is starting to be considered predictable, quick and fair, especially when compared to the pre-amendment system. With its new restructuring approach, which shares many of the same characteristics as an English Scheme of Arrangement, Spanish companies have finally been given much-needed space and time to develop an appropriate restructuring strategy.

While the CIS nations have recently provided a multitude of sizeable restructuring cases, the region’s dominant force, Russia, has stood up reasonably well to lengthy economic decline, economic sanctions and the collapse of oil and gas prices. There are now signs however, that its complex troubles are pushing certain companies towards a restructuring or insolvency position.

In light of the UK’s cram down and director-friendly processes, in particular its scheme of arrangement model, major European economies such as France, Germany and Italy have worked hard to develop regimes that give greater emphasis to pre-insolvency alternatives. These new regimes create cram down mechanisms and encourage debtor-in-possession (DIP) financings, ultimately aiming to make restructuring plans more accessible, more efficient, and crucially more reliable; essentially more in tune with the Anglo-American approach to insolvency and restructuring.

Much like the English Scheme of Arrangement which has become a popular debt restructuring solution for international debtors, the English High Court is an attractive forum for insolvency litigation thanks to the potent combination of wide-ranging powers available to Insolvency Practitioners (IPs) under the Insolvency Act 1986, and the increasing availability of litigation funding arrangements in the London market.

Liability management exercises (“LMEs”) are increasing in the bond and capital market and are often used in relatively benign situations. They are certainly not always a precursor to a full-scale restructuring or insolvency.

Prior to the recent collapse in oil values, prices existed at over $100 a barrel for over three years. It made the economics of oil exploration, production and sale comparatively straightforward, but embedded costs into the industry.

Análisis GA&P | Mayo 2016 1 N. de la C.: En las citas literales se ha rectificado en lo posible —sin afectar al sentido— la grafía de ciertos elementos (acentos, mayúsculas, símbolos, abreviaturas, cursivas...) para adecuarlos a las normas tipográficas utilizadas en el resto del texto. 1.

La Ley 27/2014, de 27 de noviembre, del Impuesto sobre Sociedades (“LIS”), aplicable a los periodos impositivos iniciados a partir del 1 de enero del 2015 introdujo importantes novedades en relación con el régimen especial de neutralidad fiscal aplicable a las operaciones de reestructuración (“Régimen Especial”).

Entre otras, el Régimen Especial ha quedado configurado como el régimen aplicable por defecto a estas operaciones, no siendo necesario optar por su aplicación (sin perjuicio de la obligación de comunicar la realización de la operación a la Administración Tributaria).

El Tribunal Supremo acepta que la ausencia de entendimiento entre los socios pueda considerarse un motivo económico válido en las operaciones de reestructuración empresarial cuando aquéllos puedan probar que sus discrepancias en cuanto a la organización empresarial condicionan la viabilidad de la empresa.

En situaciones de crisis empresarial no son extrañas demandas de despido «tácito». Aunque se trata de una denominación no recogida por el legislador laboral, reproduce la posibilidad que el artículo 50 del Estatuto de los Trabajadores otorga al trabajador para extinguir su contrato en determinadas circunstancias y con derecho a la indemnización correspondiente al despido improcedente. Este tipo de demandas suelen coincidir con los procesos concursales, si bien la realidad temporal puede ser distinta.