This month in Sharma v Top Brands Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1140 the Court of Appeal has again been asked to grapple with the question of when the illegality defence is available to defendants to actions brought by an insolvent company where the losses claimed are arguably tainted by the company's own fraudulent actions. In this instance the question for the court was whether the defence was available to a former liquidator of a company seeking to defend a claim brought against her for breach of duty under section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986).

Pre-Packs

The recent case of Oraki v Bramston and Defty [2015] EWHC 2046 (Ch) concerned former bankrupts' claims of professional negligence against their former trustees in bankruptcy (“the Trustees”). In dismissing the claims, the High Court held that the Trustees did not owe a common law duty of care to the bankrupts.

Patrick Hill and Declan Finn of DAC Beachcroft LLP, who acted on behalf of the successful Trustees, discuss the case and consider its implications for trustees in bankruptcy.

Background

Several provisions of the Small Business Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, which will come into force on 1 October 2015, are likely to have an impact on directors and their D&O insurers. The first key change is that administrators and liquidators will be able to assign insolvency claims, such as claims for wrongful trading, fraudulent trading and transactions at an undervalue, to third parties.

The UK Insolvency Service has powers to investigate directors' conduct, to commence directors' disqualification proceedings and to enter into disqualification undertakings.

In this case the High Court had to consider the mutual recognition provision in the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive ("BRRD") and the Winding Up Directive for Banks (WUD) which provide for how the insolvency of EEA banks should be managed by member states.

This case highlights the different tensions that arise in the aftermath of the collapse of Banco Espirito Santo ("BES") between how creditors are treated under the BRRD and WUD and the flexibility given to central banks to restructure good and bad debts when a bank fails.

Debtors Bankruptcy Petitions

These will shortly be made by Debtors online. We comment further on the change below, but we note that it is consistent with the Government's approach on a number of fronts to cut the taxpayer's bill for court costs.

The Insolvency Service has confirmed in the summer edition of its quarterly newsletter that applications for bankruptcy orders by debtors (as distinct to creditors) will be moving from the Courts to an online portal run by the Insolvency Service with effect from April 2016.

The June 2013 issue of Baseload included the article “A $400 Million Devil in the Details: The Cautionary Tale of the Chesapeake Par Call.” We published an update to that article in the January 2015 issue. On July 10, 2015, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that Chesapeake is required to pay the noteholders the make-whole amount.

If repayment of debt is accelerated as a result of bankruptcy, are debtholders eligible to receive a make-whole premium? The answer from an increasing number of courts is, without specific language in the indenture, no. Indentures usually include specific language to protect investors by declaring that upon certain designated “bankruptcy events,” all outstanding securities issued under that indenture become immediately due and payable (without further action from the holders of the securities).

Historically, investment grade debt with a make-whole provision was fairly straightforward. At any time during the life of the instrument, the issuer had the right to redeem the debt. But the price to be paid included the discounted value of the remaining payments of principal and interest over the life of the debt. Because the cost of paying the “make-whole” is often significant, issuers seldom redeem bonds when they are required to pay the make-whole price.