Historically, investment grade debt with a make-whole provision was fairly straightforward. At any time during the life of the instrument, the issuer had the right to redeem the debt. But the price to be paid included the discounted value of the remaining payments of principal and interest over the life of the debt. Because the cost of paying the “make-whole” is often significant, issuers seldom redeem bonds when they are required to pay the make-whole price.

Trade creditors often face the issue of whether they are required to continue providing goods or services on credit to a customer that has filed chapter 11 bankruptcy. Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy Code fails to specifically address the rights and obligations of a trade creditor facing this dilemma, resulting in a tug-of-war created by the debtor’s need for continued goods and services and the creditor’s need for assurance of payment.

Your tenant files for bankruptcy-what’s your move? Debtors who are lessees under real property leases have certain rights regarding their lease under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. Essentially, the debtor has two options: 1) reject the lease or 2) assume the lease, provided that the debtor can cure any defaults existing under the lease. Additionally, the debtor may have the right to assume and assign the lease to a third party.

Following up on our coverage in the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling that a debtor in a Chapter 7 case cannot ‘strip off’ or void a wholly unsecured junior mortgage under section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, I had the opportunity to discuss the ruling with Colin O’Keefe of LXBN TV.

This morning, the United States Supreme Court ruled that debtors in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases cannot “strip off,” or completely void, junior mortgages that—based on the value of the property and the amount of claims secured by senior mortgages—are completely underwater.

On May 4, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an opinion regarding a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (the “First Circuit”).1 The question on appeal was whether debtor Louis Bullard (“Bullard”) could immediately appeal the bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of his proposed Chapter 13 payment plan (the “Plan”).2 The Court held that denial of confirmation of a debtor’s plan is not a final, appealable order.3  

Case Background

Timely proof of claim filings by secured creditors have “been a thorn in the side of many Chapter 13 cases involving secured creditors,” according to Judge Wood in In re Pajian. However, a recent Seventh Circuit decision may cause the industry to revise their current process for proof of claim filings. Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c) requires creditors to file proofs of claim within 90 days of the date set for the meeting of creditors. Bankruptcy courts have come to conflicting conclusions on whether Rule 3002(c)’s deadline applies to all creditors or merely unsecured ones.

© 2015 Hunton & Williams LLP 1 May 2015 Oak Rock Financial District Court Addresses the Applicable Legal Standard for True Participation Agreements The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently applied two tests, the True Participation Test and the Disguised Loan Test, to determine whether agreements were true participation agreements or disguised loans.1 In addition, the District Court noted that the most important question in such a determination is the risk of loss allocation in the transaction, and that if an alleged participant is not subject to the

In Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. v. Vertin, the Delaware Court of Chancery made two key rulings concerning the rights of creditors to bring derivative lawsuits against corporate directors.¹  First,  the court held that there is no continuous insolvency requirement during the pendency of the lawsuit.

In two recent cases, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has indicated that Section 316(b) of Trust Indenture Act of 19391 (the “TIA”) requires unanimous consent for out-of- court restructurings that impair bondholders’ practical ability to receive payments, even if the bondholders’ technical, legal ability to receive payments remains intact.