Despite the absence of any provision in the Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizing the recharacterization of a debt claim to an equity interest, it generally is well-established that recharacterization is within the broad powers afforded a bankruptcy court under section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and is necessary for the proper application of the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.1 In a recharacterization analysis, a
bankruptcy court ignores the labels of a transaction, examines the facts, and determines whether a
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered the question of how much protection is required for a secured creditor to be adequately protected. Banker’s Bank of Kansas, N.A. v. Bluejay Properties, LLC (In re Bluejay Properties, LLC), Bankr. No. 12-22680 (10th Cir. Mar. 12, 2014)(unpublished).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (the “Seventh Circuit”) recently adopted a broad reading of the safe harbor of United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) § 546(e), which protects from avoidance “settlement payments” and transfers made in connection with a “securities contract,” among other transfers.1 In FCStone, the Seventh Circuit reversed the United States District Court for t
Bankruptcy trustees should clearly communicate to the bankrupt their intent to make a claim against the non-exempt equity in the bankrupt's property at the time of the assignment into bankruptcy, according to the recent decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Re Barter.1 A failure to communicate such an intent may result in the trustee being unable to realize the non-exempt equity or, as in Re Barter, the absolute discharge
Recently, two courts of appeal dismissed as moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) appeals of orders authorizing the sale of assets. The courts’ analysis focused on whether granting the appellant’s relief from the lower courts’ order would affect the asset sale. Thus the trend in the appellate courts is that only appeals that will not affect the sale itself (such as a dispute over the distribution of sale proceeds) are not subject to being dismissed as moot.
Numerous bankruptcy trustees have attempted to claw back from colleges and universities — and even from private elementary and secondary schools — the tuition payments that parents made on behalf of their children, when the parents subsequently filed for bankruptcy.
In determining their preference liability exposure, creditors typically consider whether they have provided any subsequent “new value” to the debtor after they have received an alleged preferential payment. Debtors and trustees frequently take the position that creditors cannot use as a defense any new value that has been repaid to the creditor post-petition through critical vendor payments or pursuant to Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy courts have ruled differently on this issue.
In the recent decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Orion Industries Ltd. (Trustee of) v Neil's General Contracting Ltd.1("Orion Industries") the Court interpreted and applied the rule added as part of the 2009 amendments to section 95(2) of theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act ("BIA") which deals with preferential payments. That amendment provides that evidence of pressure by a creditor is inadmissible to support a preferential payment.
Due to inconsistent decisions in the Second Circuit and Third Circuit, there has been some uncertainty as to whether a purchaser of a bankruptcy claim is subject to defenses that a debtor would have against the original creditor. Recently, this issue was settled with respect to cases filed in the Third Circuit.
On October 7, 2013, the United States Supreme Court refused to review a Seventh Circuit decision1 in the Castleton Plaza, LP case, which held that a new value plan proposed by the debtor in which an equity-holder’s spouse would provide a cash infusion to the debtor in exchange for 100 percent of the reorganiz