The latest turn in the ongoing Petters bankruptcy saga came on June 11, when U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Gregory Kishel issued a 46-page order examining 2012 amendments to the Minnesota Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (MUFTA).

The U.S. Supreme Court has issued its opinion in Baker Botts v. Asarco, holding that professionals retained in bankruptcy cases cannot receive compensation for the costs of defending their fee applications. Even if you aren’t a bankruptcy professional, there are two things to keep in mind about this opinion. First, it won’t stop us restructuring professionals from doing our jobs. Second, the reality of commercial bankruptcy practice is often at odds with the pure textual analysis favored by the Supreme Court.

On Monday, June 1, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion in Bank of America v.

Those words are from Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in the recent decision by the Supreme Court in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, which decision has generated significant press coverage (and blog postings) among bankruptcy practitioners across the country. This author certainly doesn’t intend to add to the noise out there by reciting the facts and procedural history of the case yet again.

On May 4, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an opinion regarding a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (the “First Circuit”).1 The question on appeal was whether debtor Louis Bullard (“Bullard”) could immediately appeal the bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of his proposed Chapter 13 payment plan (the “Plan”).2 The Court held that denial of confirmation of a debtor’s plan is not a final, appealable order.3  

Case Background

© 2015 Hunton & Williams LLP 1 May 2015 Oak Rock Financial District Court Addresses the Applicable Legal Standard for True Participation Agreements The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently applied two tests, the True Participation Test and the Disguised Loan Test, to determine whether agreements were true participation agreements or disguised loans.1 In addition, the District Court noted that the most important question in such a determination is the risk of loss allocation in the transaction, and that if an alleged participant is not subject to the

In Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. v. Vertin, the Delaware Court of Chancery made two key rulings concerning the rights of creditors to bring derivative lawsuits against corporate directors.¹  First,  the court held that there is no continuous insolvency requirement during the pendency of the lawsuit.

In two recent cases, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has indicated that Section 316(b) of Trust Indenture Act of 19391 (the “TIA”) requires unanimous consent for out-of- court restructurings that impair bondholders’ practical ability to receive payments, even if the bondholders’ technical, legal ability to receive payments remains intact.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently entered an order confirming that when a fraudulent transfer defendant is able to establish a defense pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

On November 5, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia issued a noteworthy opinion that runs counter to what many Virginia law practitioners assume to be the common law in Virginia – i.e., that a manager of a Virginia limited liability company owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the limited liability company.