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Historically, investment grade debt with a make-whole provision was fairly straightforward. At any time during the life of the instrument, the issuer had the right to redeem the debt. But the price to be paid included the discounted value of the remaining payments of principal and interest over the life of the debt. Because the cost of paying the “make-whole” is often significant, issuers seldom redeem bonds when they are required to pay the make-whole price.

On Jan. 21, in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation v. JPMorgan Chase Bank (In re Motors Liquidation), No. 13-2187, (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether a UCC-3 termination statement, which was improperly filed as part of the repayment of an unrelated loan, may be considered effective to terminate the security interest in question, even where none of the parties intended that result.

Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code provides creditors with a mechanism to force a recalcitrant debtor into bankruptcy through the filing of an involuntary petition for relief. Pursuant to this section, an involuntary bankruptcy case may be commenced only under Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and may only be brought against a person otherwise qualified to file a voluntary petition. Where the purported debtor has fewer than 12 creditors, the involuntary petition need only be filed by a single creditor.

On May 4, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an opinion regarding a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (the “First Circuit”).1 The question on appeal was whether debtor Louis Bullard (“Bullard”) could immediately appeal the bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of his proposed Chapter 13 payment plan (the “Plan”).2 The Court held that denial of confirmation of a debtor’s plan is not a final, appealable order.3  

Case Background

© 2015 Hunton & Williams LLP 1 May 2015 Oak Rock Financial District Court Addresses the Applicable Legal Standard for True Participation Agreements The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently applied two tests, the True Participation Test and the Disguised Loan Test, to determine whether agreements were true participation agreements or disguised loans.1 In addition, the District Court noted that the most important question in such a determination is the risk of loss allocation in the transaction, and that if an alleged participant is not subject to the

In Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. v. Vertin, the Delaware Court of Chancery made two key rulings concerning the rights of creditors to bring derivative lawsuits against corporate directors.1  First,  the court held that there is no continuous insolvency requirement during the pendency of the lawsuit.

In a case of first impression in Texas, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the former majority member of a chapter 11 LLC debtor had to relinquish control of the LLC's Facebook page and Twitter account because they were property of the LLC's bankruptcy estate. In re CTLI, LLC, Case No. 14-33564, 2015 WL 1588085 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. April 3, 2015). CTLI, LLC was a Texas gun store and shooting range doing business as Tactical Firearms.

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor in possession operates its business “as usual” during the pendency of a case. Likewise, in most cases, prepetition corporate governance practices and procedures should continue post-petition. In fact, as Judge Sontchi recently held in In re SS Body Armor I, Inc., Case No. 10-1125(CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. April 1, 2015), the right of a shareholder to compel a shareholders’ meeting for the purpose of electing a new board of directors continues during bankruptcy.  Absent “clear abuse,” the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.

In an effort to protect the property of a bankruptcy estate, Section 362(a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic stay on most proceedings against a debtor in bankruptcy. The policy of this section is to grant relief to a debtor from creditors, and to prevent a "disorganized" dissipation of the debtor's assets. (See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2000).) However, the scope of the automatic stay is not all-encompassing.