Although Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly allows payment of post-petition interest to holders of oversecured claims (i.e., where the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the claim), the Bankruptcy Code does not describe how to calculate it. No bright line rules exist dictating how to determine oversecured status, the timing of the valuation, and the rate and type of interest to be paid to oversecured creditors. Computation of post-petition interest is a frequent topic of debate among the courts.
Both the Loan Syndications and Trading Association, Inc. (the “LSTA”) and the Loan Market Association (the “LMA”) publish the forms of documentation used by sophisticated financial entities involved in the trading of large corporate syndicated loans in the secondary trading market. The LSTA based in New York was founded in 1995. The LMA based in London was formed in 1996. Both the LSTA and LMA share the common aim of assisting in developing best practices and standard documentation to facilitate the growth and liquidity of efficient trading of syndicated corporate loans.
It has not taken long for another bankruptcy court to question the propriety of allowing secured creditors to credit bid their loans. You may recall that in the case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. a Delaware bankruptcy court limited a creditor’s ability to credit bid based on self-serving testimony from a competing bidder that it would not participate in an auction absent the court capping the secured creditor’s credit bid.
Despite the absence of any provision in the Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizing the recharacterization of a debt claim to an equity interest, it generally is well-established that recharacterization is within the broad powers afforded a bankruptcy court under section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and is necessary for the proper application of the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.1 In a recharacterization analysis, a
bankruptcy court ignores the labels of a transaction, examines the facts, and determines whether a
In a recent decision that has captured the attention of the U.S. secondary loan market, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington starkly concluded that hedge funds “that acquire distressed debt and engage in predatory lending” were not eligible buyers of a loan under a loan agreement because they were not “financial institutions” within the Court’s understanding of the phrase.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered the question of how much protection is required for a secured creditor to be adequately protected. Banker’s Bank of Kansas, N.A. v. Bluejay Properties, LLC (In re Bluejay Properties, LLC), Bankr. No. 12-22680 (10th Cir. Mar. 12, 2014)(unpublished).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (the “Seventh Circuit”) recently adopted a broad reading of the safe harbor of United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) § 546(e), which protects from avoidance “settlement payments” and transfers made in connection with a “securities contract,” among other transfers.1 In FCStone, the Seventh Circuit reversed the United States District Court for t
A recent decision in the bankruptcy case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. has called into question a long-held belief that secured creditors hold dear: that debt purchased at a discount can nonetheless be credit bid at its full face amount at a collateral sale. While it remains to be seen how other courts will interpret Fisker, this decision has the potential to restrict participation in Bankruptcy Code section 363 sales and dampen liquidity in the robust secondary markets.
Recently, two courts of appeal dismissed as moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) appeals of orders authorizing the sale of assets. The courts’ analysis focused on whether granting the appellant’s relief from the lower courts’ order would affect the asset sale. Thus the trend in the appellate courts is that only appeals that will not affect the sale itself (such as a dispute over the distribution of sale proceeds) are not subject to being dismissed as moot.
Numerous bankruptcy trustees have attempted to claw back from colleges and universities — and even from private elementary and secondary schools — the tuition payments that parents made on behalf of their children, when the parents subsequently filed for bankruptcy.