On May 23, 2014, the Federal Trade Commission announced that the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection sent a letter to the court overseeing the bankruptcy proceedings for ConnectEDU Inc. (“ConnectEDU”), an education technology company, warning that the proposed sale of the company’s assets raises privacy concerns.

Although Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly allows payment of post-petition interest to holders of oversecured claims (i.e., where the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the claim), the Bankruptcy Code does not describe how to calculate it. No bright line rules exist dictating how to determine oversecured status, the timing of the valuation, and the rate and type of interest to be paid to oversecured creditors. Computation of post-petition interest is a frequent topic of debate among the courts.

Both the Loan Syndications and Trading Association, Inc. (the “LSTA”) and the Loan Market Association (the “LMA”) publish the forms of documentation used by sophisticated financial entities involved in the trading of large corporate syndicated loans in the secondary trading market. The LSTA based in New York was founded in 1995. The LMA based in London was formed in 1996. Both the LSTA and LMA share the common aim of assisting in developing best practices and standard documentation to facilitate the growth and liquidity of efficient trading of syndicated corporate loans.

Successor liability is often a concern for the acquirer when purchasing substantially all of a seller’s assets.  While this risk is well known, the circumstances under which an acquirer will be found liable under the theory of successor liability are less clear.  The recent decision in Call Center Techs., Inc. v Grand Adventures Tour & Travel Pub. Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29057, 2014 WL 85934 (D. Conn. 2014), sheds helpful light on this issue by defining the continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability.

Despite the absence of any provision in the Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizing the recharacterization of a debt claim to an equity interest, it generally is well-established that recharacterization is within the broad powers afforded a bankruptcy court under section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and is necessary for the proper application of the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.1  In a recharacterization analysis, a

bankruptcy court ignores the labels of a transaction, examines the facts, and determines whether a

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered the question of how much protection is required for a secured creditor to be adequately protected. Banker’s Bank of Kansas, N.A. v. Bluejay Properties, LLC (In re Bluejay Properties, LLC), Bankr. No. 12-22680 (10th Cir. Mar. 12, 2014)(unpublished).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (the “Seventh Circuit”) recently adopted a broad reading of the safe harbor of United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) § 546(e), which protects from avoidance “settlement payments” and transfers made in connection with a “securities contract,” among other transfers.1 In FCStone, the Seventh Circuit reversed the United States District Court for t

Law360, New York (March 25, 2014, 1:21 PM ET) -- On Feb. 11, the three private plaintiff-appellants and 11 state plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring et al. v. Jacob J. Lew et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the district court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

On Feb. 11, the three private plaintiff- appellants and 11 state plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring et al. v. Jacob J. Lew et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the district court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

On February 11th, the three private plaintiff-appellants and eleven State plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring, et al. v. Jacob J. Lew, et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the District Court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or the “Act”).