The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.

Background

The Bottom Line

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?

Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.

The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).

The Bottom Line

The Bottom Line

In CMH Liquidating Trust v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, Case No. 16-cv-14434 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (“CMH”), the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that an insurance policy that was renewed post-petition was still an executory contract, and thus, a provision denying coverage for acts leading to bankruptcy was a prohibited ipso facto clause.

What Happened?

The Bottom Line

In In re PT Bakrie Telecom Tbk, Ch. 11 Case No. 18-10200 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2019), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied a noteholder group’s request for summary judgment seeking denial of recognition of a foreign proceeding under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code because the debtor had sufficient property in the United States, the appointment of the foreign representative was effective and the Indonesian proceeding was a collective one.

What Happened?

The Bottom Line

On 19 June 2019, the much-anticipated High Court appeal in the matter of Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20 (also known as the "Amerind appeal") was handed down.