A recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Cumulus Media Holdings Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (SDNY Feb. 24, 2017) found that a proposed refinancing that was consented to by the company’s revolving credit lenders nevertheless violated the negative covenants in the company’s Credit Agreement.

The Proceedings

As the saga of the Paragon Offshore plc bankruptcy (Bankr. D. Del., No. 16-10386 (CSS)) continues, it is useful to reflect upon Judge Sontchi’s denial of confirmation of its bankruptcy plan last November. In a 70-page ruling examining the feasibility of the plan in detail, Judge Sontchi concluded that the plan proposed by the debtors was not feasible because their business plan was not reasonable, and Paragon would not be able to refinance its debt in 2021 at maturity. Balance sheet solvency upon exit was not prioritized in the court’s analysis.

In a much anticipated decision issued on March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court determined in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (Jevic) that a “structured dismissal” of a bankruptcy case cannot include a distribution scheme to creditors that does not comply with the priorities provided for under the Bankruptcy Code. The decision looks at the policy underlying “basic priority rules” in bankruptcy cases and, in doing so, throws into question the future use of negotiated settlements in bankruptcy cases where some, but not all, creditors receive a benefit.

On 23 March 2017, Justice Robson of the Supreme Court of Victoria declined to follow the Victorian Court of Appeal decision of Re Enhill, finding that the decision was not binding with respect to different legislation (the Companies Act 1961 (Vic) as opposed to theCorporations Act 2001 (Cth)).

Background

Since the early 1980s, there has been a divergence of judicial opinion in the decisions of Re EnhillPty Ltd [1983] 1 VR 561 and Re Suco Gold Pty Ltd (in liq) (1983) 33 SASR 99.

On 17 March, in Hambleton v Finn [2017] QDC 61, McGill SC DCJ of the District Court of Queensland applied the section 553C(1) setoff under the Corporations Act 2001 to a liquidator’s insolvent trading claim against a director.

His Honour followed the earlier decision of the District Court of Queensland in Morton v Rexel Electrical Supplies Pty Ltd. In that case, the set-off provision was applied where the liquidator was seeking the recovery of unfair preference payments.

When a lessee fails to comply with a notice to remedy a non-payment or other lease default, the lessor may be entitled to terminate the lease and retake possession of the property. This is commonly done by changing the locks.

However, a lessee who wants to save itself from being evicted can apply to court to prevent the lessor from retaking possession. In Queensland this application is made under section 124 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) and is known as an application for relief against forfeiture.

When is relief against forfeiture granted?

In January 2017, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its widely reported opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC vs. Education Management Corp., in which the majority held that the “right ... to receive payment” set forth in Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA) prohibits only nonconsensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms and does not protect the practical ability of bondholders to recover payment.

Background

A recent case in the Southern District of New York, U.S. Bank, NA v. T.D. Bank, NA, applied the so-called Rule of Explicitness to the allocation of recoveries among creditors outside of a bankruptcy proceeding. In the bankruptcy context, this rule requires a clear and unambiguous intention to turn over post-petition interest to senior creditors at the expense of junior creditors. The court in this case found the requisite documentary clarity to pay post-petition interest ahead of the distribution of principal.

In a decision last month, DCF Capital, LLC v. US Shale Solutions, LLC (Sup. Ct. NY Co. Jan. 24, 2017), a New York State Supreme Court justice held that a noteholder that had properly accelerated indenture debt may sue to collect that debt notwithstanding the operation of a standard no-action clause. This holding, while appealing from a noteholder perspective, may not be compelled by Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act on which it rests and is contrary to some prior case law.

Background

An unexpected controversy has arisen recently in the high-yield bond market, one involving limiting the available remedies following default in the wake of last year’s decision by the Southern District of New York in Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v.