Often, corporate boards do not consider how to handle a company bankruptcy until the moment insolvency is looming.

In reaction to a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), in which the court held that a licensee of patents, copyrights and trademarks loses its rights if the trustee or debtor in possession rejects a license under the Bankruptcy Code under which the debtor was the licensor, Congress enacted section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 365(n)).

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board announced the process for receiving and evaluating the initial resolution plans--also known as living wills--from the largest banking organizations operating in the United States. The agencies also gave a timetable for release of the public portion of such plans, which are due on July 2.

Prior to the 2009 amendments (the “Amendments”) to the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”),¹  courts exercising jurisdiction under that statute could, in the appropriate circumstances, approve “roll up” debtor in possession (“DIP”) financing arrangements.  While it can take different forms, in essence, a “roll up” DIP loan facility is an arrangement whereby an existing lender refinances or repays its pre-filing loan by way of borrowings under the new DIP loan facility.  The priority status of the charge granted by the court to secure the DIP

On May 29, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, resolved a high-profile circuit split regarding the right of secured creditors to credit bid in an asset sale under a chapter 11 plan. In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,¹ the Court held that a debtor cannot deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid as part of a chapter 11 plan providing for the sale of assets free and clear of the secured creditor’s liens on those assets.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently found that a debtor’s transfer of property owned by a corporation in which the debtor allegedly held a 50% interest did not automatically constitute a transfer of assets of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. After the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the Chapter 7 trustee filed an adversary complaint alleging that the debtor purposefully had executed a post-petition mortgage lien on certain real property owned by a corporation of which the debtor was a 50% owner.

In the Kitchener Frame Ltd¹ decision, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) confirmed that third-party releases in proposals made under the BIA² are permitted. In doing so, the Court relied on the principle that the BIA and CCAA³ ought to be read and interpreted, harmoniously. Finally, the Court sanctioned a consolidated proposal on the basis it met the requirements set out in section 59(2) of the BIA.

On March 20, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) proposed a rule (Proposed Rule), with request for comments, that implements section 210(c)(16) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act or the Act) , which permits the FDIC, as receiver for a financial company whose failure would pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States (a covered financial company), to enforce contracts of subsidiaries or affiliates of the covered financial company despite contract clauses that purport to terminate, accelerate, or provide

The Delaware Chancery Court recently found that exigent circumstances necessitated the appointment of a receiver for an insolvent company under section 291 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The insolvent company at issue had $1.9 million in tax debt and was at risk of losing a favorable settlement opportunity with the IRS due to an impasse between voting and non-voting shareholders.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) has confirmed that historical environmental remediation obligations will not automatically take priority over the claims of other creditors in an insolvency, even where those obligations are framed in the form of regulatory orders.