Credit servicing firms, the Bankers' Book Evidence Acts 1879-1959 (“BBEA”), and the evidential requirements of an application for summary judgment were recently considered by the High Court in Promomtoria (Aran) Ltd v Burns. 1 The decision issued by Noonan J shows a practical use of Order 37 of the Rules of the Superior Courts in managing evidential requirements, where the BBEA cannot be utilised.

Background

The Irish Government is planning to take measures in the areas of settlement finality, insurance, and insurance distribution in the event of a 'no-deal Brexit'. The relevant measures are set out in Parts 7 and 8 of the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Consequential Provisions) Bill 2019 (the “Withdrawal Bill”), which was published on 22 February 2019. These measures are in addition to a number of measures already taken at EU level.

Settlement Finality

Certainty is a key element in any business planning. For corporate restructuring practitioners who are planning or working on cross border transactions, the uncertainty relating to Brexit and the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union ("EU") may have long-term significant consequences and a "no-deal" Brexit (without a withdrawal agreement and the certainty of a transition period) will have immediate and significant consequences for any such cross-border transaction.

Certainty is a key element in any business planning. For corporate restructuring practitioners who are planning or working on cross border transactions, the uncertainty relating to Brexit and the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union (“EU”) may have long-term significant consequences and a “no-deal” Brexit (without a withdrawal agreement and the certainty of a transition period) will have immediate and significant consequences for any such cross-border transaction. 

What Is the "Rule in Gibbs"?

The rule in Gibbs is a long-established common law principle in which the Court of Appeal determined that a debt governed by English law cannot be discharged or compromised by a foreign insolvency proceeding(Anthony Gibbs and Sons v La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399). The rule in Gibbs remains a fundamental tenet of English insolvency law.

Why Does the Rule in Gibbs Matter?

In a brief but significant opinion, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware reversed a decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and allowed more than $30 million in unsecured, post-petition fees incurred by an indenture trustee ("Indenture Trustee").1 In reversing, the District Court relied upon a uniform body of Court of Appeals opinions issued on the subject.

The Government has approved the drafting of the Courts and Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Bill 2018. The Bill is intended to give additional protection to home owners with mortgage difficulties.

The origins of the new Bill lie in the Keeping People in their Homes Bill, a Private Member’s Bill from early 2017. The new Bill will amend the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2013 to deal with circumstances where an insolvency remedy is not available to a borrower pursuant to the 2013 Act.

The Court of Appeal has decided an important question affecting choices around methods of debt enforcement. In ACC Loan Management v Rickard,1 it looked at whether a receiver by way of equitable execution can be appointed to receive future sums to which the debtor may become entitled.

On October 20, 2017, in In re MPM Silicones, LLC ("Momentive"), Nos. 15-1682, 15-1771, 15-1824, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, considering the Supreme Court's opinion in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004), adopted the Sixth Circuit's two-step approach to determining an appropriate cramdown interest rate that, in certain circumstances, results in the application of a market rate of interest. In doing so, the Second Circuit reversed the bankruptcy and district court holdings on the cramdown interest rate issue.

In a recent judgment, the High Court has held that unfair prejudice to an investment fund creditor under a proposed Personal Insolvency Arrangement should be assessed in light of likely investment returns and not the cost of its future capital needs.