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Signed, sealed, delivered, but am I yours? Apparently not, according to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, at least in the context of allowed administrative expense claims under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code.1 The Third Circuit recently considered and ruled in a case as to when goods are deemed “received” for the purposes of determining whether a creditor may recover the value of the goods as an allowed administrative expense claim under the Bankruptcy Code.

In a recent case1 out of the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Court”), a secured creditor moved to dismiss a debtor’s bankruptcy case “for cause” based on the debtor’s bad faith filing.2 The debtor owned certain commercial real estate in south Florida (the “Commercial Property”) and leased space to various tenants, one of which had recently applied for both state and federal licenses to sell medical marijuana.3 The secured creditor had a first-position mortgage on the Commercial Property.4 After a decade-long lending relationship soured, the debtor initiated a len

Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama joined with a number of courts in finding that a debtor's ability to sell their assets free and clear of any "interests" in property encompassed the right to purge the assets of a state labor department's right to transfer a company's unemployment experience rating to a purchaser of the company's assets.[1]

Section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code is clear that a debtor can discharge a debt for money obtained by a false statement respecting the debtor's financial condition unless that statement is in writing. What has not been clear is whether a debtor's false oral statement regarding a single asset is a "statement respecting the debtor's financial condition" that falls within the ambit of 523(a)(2)(A). If so, debts obtained by such a false oral statement would be dischargeable. If not, then creditors could seek to have such fraudulently obtained debts excepted from discharge.

For many litigants, the decision whether to prosecute or defend a lawsuit vigorously boils down to a rather basic calculus: What are my chances of success? What is the potential recovery or loss? Is this a "bet the company" litigation? And, how much will I have to pay the lawyers? In many respects, it is not all that different from a poker player eyeing his chip stack and deciding whether the pot odds and implied odds warrant the call of a big bet.

For many litigants, the decision whether to prosecute or defend a lawsuit vigorously boils down to a rather basic calculus: What are my chances of success? What is the potential recovery or loss? Is this a “bet the company” litigation? And, how much will I have to pay the lawyers? In many respects, it is not all that different from a poker player eyeing his chip stack and deciding whether the pot odds and implied odds warrant the call of a big bet.

On January 17, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered a much anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Corp., No. 15-2124-cv(L), 15-2141-cv(CON), reversing the Southern District of New York's holding that only a non-consensual amendment to an indenture's core payment terms violates Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (TIA).