The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently reversed the dismissal of a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim arising out of a non-judicial foreclosure. The Ninth Circuit ruled that section 1692f(6) of the FDCPA applies to non-judicial foreclosure activity.

A copy of the opinion in Dale Dowers v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC is available at: Link to Opinion.

The Supreme Court of Indiana recently confirmed a mortgagee’s ability to seek an in rem judgment against property for which there was an outstanding lien balance after the borrowers obtained a discharge of their Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

In so ruling, the Court distinguished the difference between an in rem and in personam judgment, and rejected the borrowers’ unsupported argument that the debt was paid in full by the time the mortgagee initiated foreclosure proceedings against the borrowers.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that the collection of garnished wages earned during the 90 days prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition is an avoidable transfer, even if the garnishment was served before the 90-day preference period.

The ruling creates a potential split with the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, with the Fifth Circuit joining with the Sixth Circuit on the issue.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that certain deposits and wire transfers into a bankrupt debtor’s personal, unrestricted checking account in the ordinary course of business were not “transfers” under § 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code, affirming the district court’s and bankruptcy court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the bank in an adversary proceeding brought by the bankruptcy trustee.

The Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of a mortgagee that failed to meet the FHA requirement to either have a face-to-face meeting with the borrowers or to make “a reasonable effort” to arrange a face-to-face meeting before filing foreclosure, because doing so would have been a futile act after the borrowers’ mortgage loan debt was discharged in bankruptcy and they did not reaffirm the debt.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy trustee seeking to recover fraudulent transfers could recover direct and indirect loan repayments made after the bank had knowledge of the debtor’s Ponzi scheme, but could not recover deposits not applied to pay back the bank’s debt because the bank was not a “transferee” under the Bankruptcy Code as to ordinary bank deposits.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan recently allowed a debtor to modify his confirmed Chapter 13 plan based upon a mistake by the debtor’s counsel. The result of the modification was to reduce the plan to 36 months from 60 and reduce the repayment to unsecured creditors by 80 percent.

A copy of In re Luman is available at: Link to Opinion.

For many litigants, the decision whether to prosecute or defend a lawsuit vigorously boils down to a rather basic calculus: What are my chances of success? What is the potential recovery or loss? Is this a "bet the company" litigation? And, how much will I have to pay the lawyers? In many respects, it is not all that different from a poker player eyeing his chip stack and deciding whether the pot odds and implied odds warrant the call of a big bet.

For many litigants, the decision whether to prosecute or defend a lawsuit vigorously boils down to a rather basic calculus: What are my chances of success? What is the potential recovery or loss? Is this a “bet the company” litigation? And, how much will I have to pay the lawyers? In many respects, it is not all that different from a poker player eyeing his chip stack and deciding whether the pot odds and implied odds warrant the call of a big bet.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that “escrow funds, insurance proceeds, or miscellaneous proceeds” are protected by the anti-modification provisions for Chapter 13 bankruptcies as “incidental property” under the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in the federal Bankruptcy Code.