Celsius Networks (“Celsius”) became the latest cryptocurrency platform to raise market temperatures by halting all withdrawals, swaps and transfers from and between its customers’ accounts on June 12, 2022. Celsius touted a next wave of “unbanking,” operating a lending platform allowing the holders of digital assets the opportunity to earn a significantly high returns on those assets.

With the beginnings of the coronavirus pandemic, 2020 brought an onslaught of retail bankruptcy cases. Lord & Taylor, Ascena Brands, Neiman Marcus and JC Penny, among many others – not less than 52 in total. As the economy recovered from the initial shock of the pandemic, the number of retail bankruptcy cases subsided in 2021. According to reports, there were 21 retail cases in 2021 as retail traffic began returning to pre-pandemic levels. 2022, however, brings new pressures on the global economy, and certain that may strike the retail industry with force.

Given the recent media coverage and growing concerns among investors over the risks associated with a bankruptcy filing of a cryptocurrency exchange, it feels timely to highlight some issues that arose in the Chapter 11 cases of Cred Inc. and certain of its affiliates (collectively, “Cred”).

Unitranche financing began as a middle-market product, tracing its origins to the days of recovery from the global credit crisis. The credit markets re-opened with an explosion of available capital from traditional lenders, business development companies and other direct lenders. With an increasing supply of capital, leverage shifted to borrowers and private equity, allowing them to better dictate the terms and conditions of their loan facilities. With the greater prevalence of so-called “covenant-lite” loans, also came the exponential growth of the unitranche market.

Late last week, the District Court for the Southern District of New York provided a reminder of the importance of precise drafting. In Transform Holdco LLC v. Sears Holdings Corp. et. al., CV-05782, Doc. 20, the contractual question at issue related to the purchase of substantially all of the assets (and assumption of certain of the liabilities) of Sears and its domestic and foreign subsidiaries by Transform Holdco LLC (“Transform”) in Sears’ bankruptcy case.

An insolvency moratorium first introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic applies to nearly all Russian legal entities, individuals, and sole entrepreneurs, and bans the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Russian obligors.

The financing of commercial litigation has grown enormously since it first appeared on the scene in the US, about 15 years ago. While still small relative to the overall US financial market, it is estimated that more than $11 billion has been invested in litigation finance in the US last year alone. In essence, lenders (often referred to as “funders”) provide commercial claimants and contingency law firms with the capital needed to prosecute legal claims which the funders believe have a strong likelihood of success.

Backstop commitments have become commonplace in large corporate bankruptcy cases – they provide certainty to the debtor that it will have the funds needed to satisfy its obligations to creditors under its plan of reorganization and that it will have liquidity to operate post-bankruptcy as the reorganized entity. Backstop commitments are also a way for certain creditors to generate some additional return in the form of commitment fees and expense reimbursements in exchange for their agreement to backstop all or a material portion of a proposed rights offering or other financing arrangement.

It begins with an awkward mouthful. Outside a bankruptcy brief, is “unimpairment” even a word? (No, per Merriam-Webster.) Inside Chapter 11, it’s much more: a trend.

Want to refinance your bonds cheaply? Are you an otherwise sound and solvent business, forced into bankruptcy by a massive fire (PG&E), persistent low commodity pricing (Ultra Petroleum), or a pandemic (Hertz, whose airport rental business was shuttered in 2020 by COVID-19)?

Or would you just prefer to boost your stock value by lowering your coupon?

This is how Tribune ends: not with a bang, but a whimper. The 12-year litigation saga, rooted in the spectacular failure of the media and sports conglomerate’s 2007 leveraged buyout, reached an end in late February with a curt “cert. denied” from the US Supreme Court.

Morgan Lewis was one of the firms that captained the defense for Tribune’s former shareholders. This post notes some lessons that we learned—and relearned.

Lesson One: Section 546(e)’s ‘New’ Safe Harbor