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Asset freeze measures enacted by the United Kingdom against designated persons (DPs) can, under certain circumstances, extend to entities “owned or controlled” by DPs. To date, there have been few—and at times partly contradictory—English court cases addressing the “ownership and control” criteria under the UK sanctions regime. The latest judgment in Hellard v OJSC Rossiysky Kredit Bank sought to reconcile the previous guidance provided by the courts in the Mints and Litasco cases.

The US Supreme Court ruled in a landmark 5-4 decision on June 27, 2024 that nonconsensual third-party releases, as proposed in Purdue Pharma’s bankruptcy plan, were not permissible under the Bankruptcy Code. A nonconsensual third-party release serves to eliminate the direct claims of third parties against nondebtor parties without soliciting the consent of such affected claimants. This contrasts with consensual releases and opt-in or opt-out mechanisms permitted by courts.

As a wise man is wont to say, “Where you stand depends on where you sit.”

This statement applies with full force to the recent, related opinions from Judge Marvin Isgur of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, addressing the effects of a so-called “uptier” liability management transaction.1

Procedurally, Judge Isgur’s rulings denied in part and granted in part motions for summary judgment, permitting certain claims to proceed to trial beginning on January 25, 2024.

The last 12 months have seen a steady increase in restructuring and stressed or distressed financing transactions in the European market across a range of sectors, including tech, real estate, hospitality, manufacturing and retail.

One of the primary goals of bankruptcy law is to provide debtors with a fresh start by imposing an automatic stay and allowing for claims of reorganizing debtors to be discharged. In environmental law, a primary goal is to ensure that the “polluter pays” for environmental harms. These two goals collide when an entity with environmental liabilities enters bankruptcy. The result is often outcomes that are the exception, rather than the rule, with many unsettled areas of law that can be dealt with by bankruptcy courts in varying ways.

Celsius’ retail borrowers finally have an answer on who owns the cryptocurrency they deposited into Celsius in exchange for a loan from Celsius – spoiler alert: on November 13, 2023 the bankruptcy court held that Celsius’ terms of service “clearly and unambiguously” gave Celsius ownership of retail borrowers’ cryptocurrency. The bankruptcy court’s decision follows its January 2023 decision which similarly held that the cryptocurrency of Celsius’ “Earn” customers also belonged to Celsius because the terms of service similarly unambiguously granted Celsius title ownership.

Can a debtor reinstate a defaulted loan under a Chapter 11 plan without paying default rate interest? This question was analyzed thoroughly in a recent Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court decision by Judge Philip Bentley.

In a decision likely to have a knock-on effect for future fraudulent transfer defense and valuation litigation, the Delaware bankruptcy court recently ruled that the price agreed in the sale of an oil and gas company closed by market participants represents the reasonably equivalent value for the assets being sold and is more reliable evidence of value than expert testimony prepared for the purposes of litigation.

In the wake of several high-profile collapses of cryptocurrency exchanges, most notably FTX, Celsius, and Voyager, the state of the digital asset landscape is ever-changing, with more questions and landmines than clear paths forward. Among the many issues that arise in these bankruptcy cases is the question of how to treat and classify digital assets, especially cryptocurrencies—e.g., who owns the cryptocurrencies deposited by customers.

On May 5, 2023, the SEC filed a civil complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York against a mutual fund’s adviser for aiding and abetting violations of Rule 22e-4 (the “Liquidity Rule”) by the mutual fund it advised (the “Fund”) and whose Liquidity Risk Management Program (“LRMP”) it administered.