In Part 1, we discussed how, despite widespread usage, termination in the event of bankruptcy clauses (“ipso facto” clauses) are generally unenforceable pursuant to the bankruptcy code. In this second part, we discuss why these clauses are still prevalent in commercial transactions and the exceptions that allow for enforceability in certain situations.

Why Do Ipso Facto Clauses Remain in Most Contracts?

If ipso facto clauses are generally not enforceable, then why do practically all commercial agreements continue to include them? There are several reasons.

Practically all commercial transactions, including licenses, services agreements, and supply agreements, contain a provision that triggers termination rights, without notice, to a party whenever the other party files for bankruptcy or experiences other insolvency-related event. In Part 1 of a two-part series, we discuss how the commonly used termination-on-insolvency clauses are generally unenforceable despite their widespread use.

Standard Ipso Facto Provision

Contrary to the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling, the District Court concluded that California's liquidated damages statute does not apply to the default interest rate provision.

This is a favorable decision for commercial secured lenders. Although the ruling is not controlling on other bankruptcy courts as it is a trial court level ruling, courts may certainly consider it when presented with similar issues.

In In re 1111 Myrtle Avenue Group, LLC (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019), a New York bankruptcy court held that a default interest rate provision of 7 percent was enforceable and not a penalty against a debtor, which retained significant equity postbankruptcy.

Background

The Revel decision provides a cautionary tale for purchasers under Section 363.

In re Altadena Lincoln Crossing LLC, 2018 Westlaw 3244502 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.), a California bankruptcy court held that a default interest rate provision was an unenforceable penalty under applicable California law because, among other things, the applicable loan agreements did not contain an estimate of the probable costs to the lender resulting from the debtor’s default.

Background

In a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York recently analyzed whether a debtor may exempt from her bankruptcy estate a retirement account that was bequeathed to her upon the death of her parent. In In re Todd, 585 B.R. 297 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y 2018), the court addressed an objection to a debtor’s claim of exemption in an inherited retirement account, and held that the property was not exempt under New York and federal law.

In Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries (In re BFW Liquidation), 899 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that a liability for an allegedly preferential transfer may be reduced by the amount of new value given, regardless of whether that new value has already been repaid by the debtor before its bankruptcy filing.

In retail bankruptcies, it is important for suppliers consigning goods to merchants to be aware of the commercial law rules governing consignments. Disputes among consignors, inventory lenders, and bankruptcy debtors have been arising frequently in retail bankruptcy cases. Disputes like these can be avoided if consignors consider the basics of commercial law rules governing consignments, particularly under the Uniform Commercial Code, and take steps to protect their rights and interests.

On June 4, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lamar Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling,[1] resolving a circuit split on the issue of whether a debtor’s statement about a single asset constitutes “a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).