In (Re) Indalex, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) affirmed the super-priority of the security granted to a debtor-in-possession (DIP) lender, over a deemed trust created under provincial pension legislation, in the context of a Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceeding. The SCC’s analysis leaves open further issues.

Is a bankrupt pledgor legally bound to fulfill its promise to pledge a gift; or will a nonprofit have a successful claim against a pledgor if there is a subsequent failure to make payment because of a bankruptcy filing? A district court in Arizona recently held that St. Joseph's, a nonprofit hospital, did not have an enforceable claim in Bashas' Inc.'s bankruptcy for Bashas' $50,000 charitable pledge because of Bashas' bankruptcy. In re Bashas' Inc., 2012 WL 5289501 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2012).

In Re Sino-Forest Corporation¹, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the interpretation of “equity claims” employed by Justice Morawetz of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List).

One of the most powerful tools a chapter 11 debtor has is the ability to assume or reject executory contracts under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.  In bankruptcy parlance, when a debtor “rejects” an executory contract, it is considered as though the debtor breached the agreement as of the date it filed for bankruptcy and sheds the debtor’s obligation to perform under the rejected contract.  The non-debtor party receives a claim for damages arising from the debtor’s breach; however, in many cases, it will be worth only pennies on the dollar.  The converse of rejection is

In a recent decision authored by Chief Judge Easterbrook, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, Docket No. 11-3920 (7th Cir. July 9, 2012)) held that the licensee of a trademark does not necessarily lose the right to use the licensed marks when a debtor-licensor rejects the underlying license agreement in its bankruptcy case.  In so holding, the Court rejected a contrary decision reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.

In 2009, the owners and management of The Philadelphia Inquirer, one of the nation's largest daily circulation newspapers, proposed a bankruptcy plan that attacked secured creditors' rights to bid their loans. When the District Court and the Third Circuit both approved the tactic, the plan gained national attention.

Baker Hostetler serves as court-appointed counsel to Irving H. Picard, SIPA Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Securities LLC (“BLMIS”). In January of 2011, the SIPA Trustee obtained approval from the United States Bankruptcy Court for a $5 billion settlement for BLMIS customers with allowed claims. At the same time, the Bankruptcy Court also issued a permanent injunction with respect to claims that were duplicative or derivative of the SIPA Trustee’s claims. After an appeal, the District Court affirmed the settlement and the injunction in March of 2012.

Prior to the 2009 amendments (the “Amendments”) to the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”),¹  courts exercising jurisdiction under that statute could, in the appropriate circumstances, approve “roll up” debtor in possession (“DIP”) financing arrangements.  While it can take different forms, in essence, a “roll up” DIP loan facility is an arrangement whereby an existing lender refinances or repays its pre-filing loan by way of borrowings under the new DIP loan facility.  The priority status of the charge granted by the court to secure the DIP

Bankruptcy cases can be expensive affairs not only for the debtor, but also for creditors trying to obtain payment on their claims. A Bankruptcy Court in the Middle District of Florida recently approved a provision in a chapter 11 plan allowing for certain unsecured creditors to be reimbursed for their legal fees if their participation in the case helped maximize recoveries for other creditors, even though the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly allow for this kind of reimbursement.

In the Kitchener Frame Ltd¹ decision, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) confirmed that third-party releases in proposals made under the BIA² are permitted. In doing so, the Court relied on the principle that the BIA and CCAA³ ought to be read and interpreted, harmoniously. Finally, the Court sanctioned a consolidated proposal on the basis it met the requirements set out in section 59(2) of the BIA.