The Supreme Court held that a statement about a single asset can be a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” for purposes of determining the application of the exception to discharge set forth in Section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling, 2018 WL 2465174 (June 4, 2018).
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Merit Mgmt. Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 883 (2018), held that transfers made by and to entities that are not “financial institutions” or other covered entities fall outside of the scope of the § 546(e) safe harbor even if they are made through financial institutions or other covered entities. The Supreme Court’s decision resolves a circuit split over how the § 546(e) safe harbor applies to transactions involving conduit entities and could impact future disputes involving safe harbors under the Bankruptcy Code.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 883 (2018), held that transfers made by or to entities that are not “financial institutions” or other covered entities fall outside the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 546(e)’s “safe harbor” from a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code, even if those transfers are made through financial institutions or other covered entities.
In a unanimous decision in Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the scope of a Bankruptcy Code exception to the “avoiding powers” of a bankruptcy trustee or Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession that permit invalidation (i.e., avoidance and clawback) of a limited category of transfers of property by a debtor or of a debtor’s interest in property.
In U.S. Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an important decision on standards of appellate review, holding that appellate courts should review a bankruptcy court’s determination of whether a particular creditor is a “nonstatutory insider” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code under the highly deferential “clearly erroneous” standard of review.
bakerlaw.com 1 Financial Services 2017 Year-End Report 2 FINANCIAL SERVICES 2017 YEAR-END REPORT Table of Contents Introduction 3 Litigation 4 Industry Developments 5 Representative Matters 7 Emerging Issues and Trends 8 Lending 10 Industry Developments 11 Representative Matters 11 Emerging Issues and Trends 12 Regulatory, Compliance and Licensing 13 Industry Developments 14 Representative Matters 16 Emerging Issues and Trends 16 Restructuring 18 Industry Developments 19 Representative Matters 19 Emerging Issues and Trends 20 Conclusion and Contact Us 22 3 FINANCIAL SERVICES 2017 YEAR-END R
On March 20, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed Senate Bill 220 into law. The bill is designed to limit the ability of defendants in foreclosure proceedings to keep contesting the foreclosure after agreeing, in bankruptcy, to surrender the property to their lenders.
Continuing low interest rates and generally improved economic conditions in the U.S. and worldwide during 2017 have reduced financial distress and the need for business bankruptcies in most sectors. However, out-of-court financial restructurings and Chapter 11 bankruptcies will continue in 2018 due to significant market changes in the energy, retail and health care industries that have developed over the past several years.
On August 10, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court rescinded the grant of certiorari in PEM Entities LLC v. Levin on the grounds that review had been “improvidently granted.” The case seemingly provided a perfect vehicle to resolve the circuit split on whether federal or state law governs debt recharacterization in bankruptcy, and less than two months after the Court first agreed to hear the case, its dismissal came as a surprise.
In recent years, courts have become increasingly critical of the doctrine of equitable mootness, a judicially created abstention doctrine that allows appellate courts to dismiss appeals from a bankruptcy court’s confirmation order in certain circumstances. Although the doctrine is meant to be applied only sparingly, to avoid unscrambling complex reorganizations on appeal, it has been invoked in noncomplex cases or where limited relief is practicable. As a result, some circuit courts have urged a more limited application of the doctrine.