After Energy Future Holdings (EFH), maybe not so much. The size of the break-up fee approved by the bankruptcy court in EFH was undoubtedly large by any account – US$275 million. But it was approved following all necessary filings, notice and hearings. All parties and counsel involved were highly sophisticated and experienced. The court that approved the fee was the Delaware bankruptcy court, by all accounts one of the most experienced and sophisticated bankruptcy courts in the nation. And there wasn’t even a hint of fraud, misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts.

Shareholder of a Korean corporation (“Cuzco Korea”), the sole member of a chapter 11 limited liability company debtor (“Cuzco USA” or the “Debtor”), brought an adversary proceeding against the Debtor and others, asserting claims directly, derivatively on behalf of Cuzco Korea and “double derivatively” on behalf of the Debtor. On the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the bankruptcy court for the district of Hawaii was required to consider the impact of Korean law on the derivative claims as well as notions of forum non conveniens.

In a decision widely anticipated by investors in emerging market and distressed debt, the Court of Appeal has upheld the decision of the High Court to refuse to grant an indefinite moratorium on claims under certain English law debts under the Cross Border Insolvency Rules (“CBIR”). In doing so, the Court of Appeal has reaffirmed a long-standing principle of English common law that provides important protection to creditors; known as the Rule in Gibbs, the rule provides that a debt may only be discharged according to its own governing law.

On July 19, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals entered a decision upholding the results of a foreclosure sale against a debtor’s allegation that the sale was a preference because the bankruptcy estate could have sold the property for a higher price. Veltre v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Veltre), Case No. 17-2889 (3d Cir. July 19, 2018).

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently held in In re Woodbridge Group of Companies, LLC that while Rule 3001 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism for transfers of claims, Rule 3001 is not a substantive provision allowing claims trading for notes with legally valid anti-assignment provisions.

Background

The recent decision of the London Commercial Court in PJSC Tatneft v Gennady Bogolyubov & Ors [2018] EWHC 1314 (Comm) highlights the importance that the Court will attach to full asset disclosure by a respondent to ensure the effectiveness of a freezing order, even in circumstances where the value of a respondent’s assets exceeds the sum frozen by the order.

Freezing Orders: What Are They?

In the recent decision in Carlos Sevilleja Garcia v Marex Financial Limited,1 the Court of Appeal helpfully summarised the justifications for the English law rule against claims for reflective loss and confirmed that the rule applies equally to unsecured creditors of a company as it does to shareholders.

Highlights

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded an Oregon bankruptcy court’s order designating recently acquired claims of a secured creditor for bad faith, holding that a bad faith finding requires “something more.” Specifically, the Court found that a bankruptcy court may not designate claims for bad faith simply because (1) a creditor offers to purchase only a subset of available claims in order to block a plan of reorganization, and/or (2) blocking the plan will adversely impact the remaining creditors.Pacific Western Bank, et al. v.

(Excerpted from “Retail Bankruptcies – Protections for Landlords,” Practical Law Journal, May 2018, by Lars Fuller)

Due to increasing competition from online sellers, recent years have seen a dramatic uptick in Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings by multistate brick-and-mortar retailers – some that have dozens, or even hundreds, of storefronts. These bankruptcies create challenges for the commercial landlords that own the shopping centers, malls and other establishments that those retailers rented.

Ground leases are fairly common but sometimes overlooked property interests. A succinct but adequate definition of a ground lease was articulated by Herbert Thorndike Tiffany (Tiffany on Real Property § 85.50 [3d ed.]) as follows: