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Under Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) section 436, unless a defined benefit pension plan sponsored by a debtor in bankruptcy is fully funded, the plan may not make “prohibited payments” (i.e., lump sum payments or payments in any other form that exceed the monthly amount under a single life annuity). Moreover, the anti-cutback rule in Code section 411(d)(6) prohibits a plan from being amended to eliminate an optional form of benefit.

The Department of Labor (“DOL”) sued the president of several related companies to establish his personal liability for more than $67,000 in employee contributions never remitted to the employer sponsored benefit plans and to prevent him from discharging this liability in his pending personal bankruptcy action. Over a nearly three-year period, the companies withheld but never remitted the employee contributions to the companies’ group health and 401(k) plans (the “Plans”).

A federal court recently held that two investment funds are not jointly and severally liable for a bankrupt portfolio company’s withdrawal liability to a multiemployer pension plan disagreeing with a 2007 opinion by the Appeals Board of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (the “PBGC”). The Massachusetts U.S. District Court ruled there was no liability because the investment funds are not “trades or businesses” for purposes of ERISA’s joint and several liability rules.

One of a business’s greatest concerns with data storage and backup is security, that is, how can you make sure your data is safe both internally and externally if using cloud solutions? Many businesses do not use cloud based solutions because of the perceived security risks. 

The Bankruptcy Code provides a number of “safe harbors” for forward contracts and other derivatives. These provisions exempt derivatives from a number of Bankruptcy Code provisions, including portions of the automatic stay,1 restrictions on terminating executory contracts,2 and the method for calculating rejection damages.3 The safe harbor provisions also protect counterparties to certain types of contracts from the avoidance actions created under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, such as the preference and fraudulent transfer statutes.4

Following a case known as Goldacre, it was held that if an administrator is in occupation of a leasehold property, which is being retained for the purposes of the administration, and rent falls due (monthly or quarterly) during his / her occupation, then such rent is to be treated as an expense of the administration (and therefore paid in priority to unsecured creditors). This remains the case even if the administrator occupies only part of the property and whether or not he / she occupies the property for the whole quarter.

  1. Introduction

Recent cases interpreting Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., as amended) (the “Bankruptcy Code”) suggest that there are different standards for recognizing whether domestic entities and foreign entities have filed insolvency proceedings in the proper venue.

The Bankruptcy Abuse, Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, which was signed into law in the United States on April 20, 2005 and went into effect, for the most part, on October 17, 2005, created a new chapter of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. 101, et seq., as amended) (the “Bankruptcy Code”) – Chapter 15. Chapter 15 replaces and modifies the earlier Bankruptcy Code sections that dealt with multi-national insolvency proceedings.

On July 9, 2012, the Seventh Circuit decided in Sunbeam1 that the rejection of a trademark license by a bankrupt trademark licensor does not deprive the trademark licensee of its right to continue to use the trademark, and disagreed with the 1985 Fourth Circuit decision in Lubrizol2 that held to the contrary.3 In reaction to the Lubrizol decision, which held that the rejection of a license by a bankrupt licensor of intellectual property terminated the rights of the licensee, Congress enacted Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy

The Issue

The issue is whether the insolvency of a borrower under a non-recourse loan can trigger recourse liability for itself and its “bad boy,” non-recourse carve-out guarantors.