The definition of a contract for the sale of goods under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SOGA) is one in which the seller transfers the property in the goods to the buyer for money consideration, i.e. the price.
Under section 49 of SOGA, an unpaid seller can claim for the price of the goods if either: (1) the property in the goods has passed to the buyer; (2) or payment of the price is expressed to be payable on a certain day irrespective of delivery
In Brooks and another v Armstrong [1], joint liquidators applied for orders against directors of the insolvent company (the Company) under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the Act) (the wrongful trading provision) and for remedies to be awarded against delinquent directors under section 212 of the Act.
On 1 April 2015, an estimated 5,000 private landlords across Liverpool were affected by the implementation of a city-wide selective licensing scheme. Whilst Liverpool is the first major city to introduce the scheme city-wide, several local authorities have adopted selective licensing for their boroughs including the London Boroughs of Newham, Hackney, Croydon and Brent.
Following on from our earlier advice on enforcing money judgments, Walker Morris’ banking litigators answer some more frequently asked questions.
Client Question 3
I have heard that I can enforce a money judgment via a third party debt order or an attachment of earnings. What are these and what are the advantages/disadvantages?
Walker Morris Answer
Sophisticated real estate lenders spend significant amounts of time and energy attempting to insulate themselves from potential bankruptcy filings by their borrowers. A primary reason, which many an experienced real estate lender has found out the hard way, is the risk that a debtor in bankruptcy may “cram down” a plan of reorganization over its lender’s objection. Under a typical cramdown plan, a debtor may stretch out payments to its secured creditor for several years and attempt to replace its negotiated interest rate with a new, below- market rate of interest.
A recent decision by a New Jersey bankruptcy court scrambles the law regarding rejected trademark licenses.1 Crumbs was a multi-location bakery that also licensed its trademarks and trade secrets to third parties. In July of 2014 Crumbs filed a Chapter 11 reorganization case and in August of 2014 the court entered an order selling substantially all of the assets of Crumbs to LFAC2 free and clear of liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests.
In a case that should cause lenders heartburn, the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina recently ruled that common provisions in a Chapter 11 plan prevented the debtor’s lender from executing on a judgment against the non-debtor owner of the debtor.1 Biltmore is a corporation2 that operates manufactured home parks and sells and rents manufactured homes. McGee is the president and controlling shareholder of Biltmore. Biltmore filed Chapter 11 in January of 2011, and TD Bank was Biltmore’s largest secured creditor.
On August 26, 2014, Judge Robert D. Drain of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a bench ruling in In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (RDD), on several aspects of the plan of reorganization filed by debtor Momentive Performance Materials, Inc., a specialty chemicals manufacturing company, and its affiliated debtors.
On August 15, 2014, the Eleventh Circuit entered a Memorandum Opinion in the Wortley v. Chrispus Venture Capital, LLC case (In re Global Energies, LLC, “Global”)1 unwinding a section 363 sale order entered in 2010 by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida based on a finding of bad faith in the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy case in 2010.
On September 3, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered an opinion vacating various orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court and District Court for the Southern District of Texas (the “Bankruptcy Court” and the “District Court”) in the bankruptcy cases of TMT Procurement Corporation and its affiliated debtors (the “Debtors”), including a final order approving the Debtors’ post-petition debtor in possession financing (the “DIP Order”) with Macqua