A recent decision by a New Jersey bankruptcy court scrambles the law regarding rejected trademark licenses.¹ Crumbs was a multi-location bakery that also licensed its trademarks and trade secrets to third parties. In July of 2014 Crumbs filed a Chapter 11 reorganization case and in August of 2014 the court entered an order selling substantially all of the assets of Crumbs to LFAC² free and clear of liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests.

In a case that should cause lenders heartburn, the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina recently ruled that common provisions in a Chapter 11 plan prevented the debtor’s lender from executing on a judgment against the non-debtor owner of the debtor.¹ Biltmore is a corporation² that operates manufactured home parks and sells and rents manufactured homes. McGee is the president and controlling shareholder of Biltmore. Biltmore filed Chapter 11 in January of 2011, and TD Bank was Biltmore’s largest secured creditor.

Section 30A(1) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (the “BO”), provides that the bankruptcy period, for a person who has been adjudged bankrupt for the first time, runs for four years. However, section 30A(4) of the BO provides eight grounds upon which the Court, on the application of the trustee in bankruptcy or a creditor, can order the suspension of a bankruptcy period – in effect lengthening the period of bankruptcy.

On August 26, 2014, Judge Robert D. Drain of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a bench ruling in In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (RDD), on several aspects of the plan of reorganization filed by debtor Momentive Performance Materials, Inc., a specialty chemicals manufacturing company, and its affiliated debtors.

On August 15, 2014, the Eleventh Circuit entered a Memorandum Opinion in the Wortley v. Chrispus Venture Capital, LLC case (In re Global Energies, LLC, “Global”)¹ unwinding a section 363 sale order entered in 2010 by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida based on a finding of bad faith in the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy case in 2010.

On September 3, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered an opinion vacating various orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court and District Court for the Southern District of Texas (the “Bankruptcy Court” and the “District Court”) in the bankruptcy cases of TMT Procurement Corporation and its affiliated debtors (the “Debtors”), including a final order approving the Debtors’ post-petition debtor in possession financing (the “DIP Order”) with Macqua

A bankrupt can be required to pay a portion of his income earned during the bankruptcy to his or her trustees by way of a contribution to the bankrupt estate. Such payments can be fixed by the court pursuant to section 43E of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap 6 of the Laws of Hong Kong) or agreed between the bankrupt and the trustees on an informal basis, and are calculated after assessing the bankrupt's reasonable expenses.

This is a case with respect to the interpretation of the words "the applicant's entitlement to severance payment" in section 16(2)(f)(i) of the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance (the "PWIO").

Under the PWIO, the applicant may apply for an ex-gratia payment from the Protection of Wages on insolvency Fund (the "Fund") as his former employer entered into voluntary liquidation.

The relevant sections of the PWIO are set out below:-

"15(1) ......an applicant to whom:-

On January 17, 2014 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a ruling in Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No. 13-13087 (KG), which highlights potential risks to both secured creditors and purchasers of claims in bankruptcy section 363 sales. The facts in Fisker are straightforward. Fisker was founded in 2007 to make high-end electric cars and was financed principally with federal and state government loans secured by some, but not all, of Fisker’s assets.

In In re KB Toys,¹ a recent decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court held that a claim that is disallowable under § 502(d)² if held by the original claimant is also disallowable in the hands of a purchaser or subsequent transferee. In other words, if a creditor sells or assigns its claim to a claims trader and the creditor later becomes liable on a preference or fraudulent transfer,³ the claim may be disallowed in the hands of the claims trader if the creditor fails to pay the amount it owes to the estate.