On June 1, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, in which all nine Justices joined in an opinion that reversed an Eleventh Circuit ruling that chapter 7 debtors may “strip off” wholly unsecured junior liens. The Caulkett opinion largely relies upon the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), in which the Court held that a chapter 7 debtor may not “strip down” liens where the value of the property partially secures the underlying claim.
Currently before the Supreme Court is Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, L.L.C.,2 in which the Court will determine whether bankruptcy judges have discretion to award compensation for the defense of a fee application under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a). The decision in Baker Botts will likely resolve a circuit split and make clear whether a defense of a fee application is necessary to the administration of the case and, therefore, compensable.
Following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision last year in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the filing of a proof of claim on a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy case pending in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (“FDCPA”). But as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama recently made clear in Gurganus v. Recovery Management Systems Corp. (In re Gurganus), No. 7:14-ap-70054-BGC, 2015 WL 65089 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear Bullard v. Hyde Park Savings Bank (In re Bullard), U.S., No. 14-116 (cert. granted 12/12/14). The Court's decision in this case will resolve a circuit split with regard to whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is a final order appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The decision has the potential to impact Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 cases.
A recent decision by a New Jersey bankruptcy court scrambles the law regarding rejected trademark licenses.1 Crumbs was a multi-location bakery that also licensed its trademarks and trade secrets to third parties. In July of 2014 Crumbs filed a Chapter 11 reorganization case and in August of 2014 the court entered an order selling substantially all of the assets of Crumbs to LFAC2 free and clear of liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests.
In a case that should cause lenders heartburn, the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina recently ruled that common provisions in a Chapter 11 plan prevented the debtor’s lender from executing on a judgment against the non-debtor owner of the debtor.1 Biltmore is a corporation2 that operates manufactured home parks and sells and rents manufactured homes. McGee is the president and controlling shareholder of Biltmore. Biltmore filed Chapter 11 in January of 2011, and TD Bank was Biltmore’s largest secured creditor.
Section 1322(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code1 allows debtors to cure defaults and reinstate a
mortgage on their principal residence "until such residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is
conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law."2
Like many provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, this one appears fairly straightforward at first glance; a debtor has the right to
cure and reinstate a home mortgage until the property is sold at a foreclosure sale.
On August 26, 2014, Judge Robert D. Drain of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a bench ruling in In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (RDD), on several aspects of the plan of reorganization filed by debtor Momentive Performance Materials, Inc., a specialty chemicals manufacturing company, and its affiliated debtors.
On August 15, 2014, the Eleventh Circuit entered a Memorandum Opinion in the Wortley v. Chrispus Venture Capital, LLC case (In re Global Energies, LLC, “Global”)1 unwinding a section 363 sale order entered in 2010 by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida based on a finding of bad faith in the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy case in 2010.
On September 3, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered an opinion vacating various orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court and District Court for the Southern District of Texas (the “Bankruptcy Court” and the “District Court”) in the bankruptcy cases of TMT Procurement Corporation and its affiliated debtors (the “Debtors”), including a final order approving the Debtors’ post-petition debtor in possession financing (the “DIP Order”) with Macqua