In our client alert dated September 14, 2016, we discussed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, which refused to invalidate a bankruptcy filing made without the consent of its lender who held a “Golden Share” as void against federal public policy.
On November 17, 2016, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion holding that claims for “make-whole” amounts were valid and enforceable as “redemption premiums” under New York law despite the automatic acceleration of the underlying debt upon the issuer filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. See In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., No. 16-1351 (3d Cir. Nov. 17, 2016) (the “EFH Decision”).
In our previous two news alerts,1 we examined decisions that potentially undermine key elements of the legal structures that lenders created in response to their experiences in the United States Bankruptcy Courts during the real estate downturn of 1988 through 1992, including the involuntary restructure of their indebtedness and liens under the cram-down provisions of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Codeâ€).
As a service to energy industry participants, the lawyers of the Oilfield Services and Bankruptcy Practices at Haynes and Boone, LLP have been tracking and reporting industry developments in oilfield service restructurings. Our research includes details on 100 bankruptcies filed since the beginning of 2015, including secured and unsecured debt totals for each case. The total amount of aggregate debt administered in oilfield services bankruptcy cases in 2015- 2016 is more than $14 billion and the average debt of these cases exceeds $144 million.
I. Introduction
The enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which ended the many tax shelter advantages previously available to real estate investors, coupled with the savings and loan crises, effectively collapsed the real estate boom of the early-to-mid 1980’s. From 1988 to 1993, countless numbers of real estate loans went into default and many real estate borrowers sought to involuntarily restructure their loans through the “cram-down” provisions of Chapter 11 under title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).
In most financing transactions, particularly project finance transactions, lenders seek to obtain security over all of a borrower’s assets. One crucial asset that sometimes does not get sufficient attention is insurance proceeds. Lenders are accustomed to ensuring access to the borrower’s insurance coverage through “additional insured” or “loss payee” provisions.
Nearly every day a different E&P company makes an announcement that indicates the company is facing financial distress, insolvency or bankruptcy. Many of these companies are Operators under Joint Operating Agreements and with each announcement there are likely Non-Operators concerned about the impact these events will have on their non-operated working interests. Non-Operators should understand their JOA rights and options when their Operator becomes distressed.
Frequently a debtor’s assets are sold out of bankruptcy “free and clear” of liens and claims under §363(f). While the Bankruptcy Code imposes limits on this ability to sell assets, it does allow the sale free and clear if “such interest is in bona fide dispute” or if the price is high enough or the holder of the adverse interest “could be compelled ... to accept a money satisfaction of such interest” or if nonbankruptcy law permits such sale free and clear of such interest.
On February 5, 2016 the IRS released Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum Number 201606027 (the IRS Memo) concluding that “bad boy guarantees” may cause nonrecourse financing to become, for tax purposes, the sole recourse debt of the guarantor. This can dramatically affect the tax basis and at-risk investment of the borrowing entity’s partners or members. Non-recourse liability generally increases the tax basis and at-risk investment of all parties but recourse liability increases only that of the guarantor.