In our previous two news alerts,1 we examined decisions that potentially undermine key elements of the legal structures that lenders created in response to their experiences in the United States Bankruptcy Courts during the real estate downturn of 1988 through 1992, including the involuntary restructure of their indebtedness and liens under the cram-down provisions of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Codeâ€).
As a service to energy industry participants, the lawyers of the Oilfield Services and Bankruptcy Practices at Haynes and Boone, LLP have been tracking and reporting industry developments in oilfield service restructurings. Our research includes details on 100 bankruptcies filed since the beginning of 2015, including secured and unsecured debt totals for each case. The total amount of aggregate debt administered in oilfield services bankruptcy cases in 2015- 2016 is more than $14 billion and the average debt of these cases exceeds $144 million.
I. Introduction
The enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which ended the many tax shelter advantages previously available to real estate investors, coupled with the savings and loan crises, effectively collapsed the real estate boom of the early-to-mid 1980’s. From 1988 to 1993, countless numbers of real estate loans went into default and many real estate borrowers sought to involuntarily restructure their loans through the “cram-down” provisions of Chapter 11 under title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).
When the debt owed by a debtor is cancelled or forgiven, the debtor generally has cancellation of indebtedness (COD) income. COD income is generally includable in gross income, but may be excluded under section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code in some instances. A statutory exclusion exists for COD income that arises in a title 11 bankruptcy case or when the taxpayer is insolvent. Final regulations were issued recently that apply these exclusions to a grantor trust or a disregarded entity (DRE).
In recent years, constructively fraudulent transfer claims asserted in bankruptcy cases, especially those arising from LBOs and similar shareholder transactions, have hit a major road block.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently issued an opinion that addresses, among other issues, the question of whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code preempts certain fraudulent transfer avoidance actions brought under state law. In re Physiotherapy Holdings Inc., No. 15-51238 (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2016).
In most financing transactions, particularly project finance transactions, lenders seek to obtain security over all of a borrower’s assets. One crucial asset that sometimes does not get sufficient attention is insurance proceeds. Lenders are accustomed to ensuring access to the borrower’s insurance coverage through “additional insured” or “loss payee” provisions.
Nearly every day a different E&P company makes an announcement that indicates the company is facing financial distress, insolvency or bankruptcy. Many of these companies are Operators under Joint Operating Agreements and with each announcement there are likely Non-Operators concerned about the impact these events will have on their non-operated working interests. Non-Operators should understand their JOA rights and options when their Operator becomes distressed.
The issue of whether gathering agreements are subject to rejection in bankruptcy as executory contracts and whether certain provisions of those agreements run with the land and survive rejection will impact ongoing bankruptcy proceedings of producers, as well as renegotiations of existing gathering agreements.