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On October 11, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States granted cert in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, No. 16-348 (Oct. Term 2016) to resolve a split among the Circuits as to the FDCPA’s prohibition against deceptive collection practices in the context of filing proofs of claim for debts where a collection action would otherwise be time-barred.

The U.S. Supreme Court will hear the case of Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. during the new term that began last week. The questions it presents are relatively simple. First, can a bankruptcy court, in dismissing a case under the U.S.

On October 4, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that chapter 7 debtors who file a statement of intention to surrender real property in bankruptcy cannot later contest a foreclosure action, and bankruptcy courts have broad power and authority to sanction violations. Failla v. CitiBank, N.A., case no. 15-15626 (11th Cir. October 4, 2016).

The ability of a secured creditor to credit bid its debt in connection with a sale of a debtor’s assets received a strong boost in a decision last month in the Chapter 11 case of Aeropostale from U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Sean Lane of the Southern District of New York.

In Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions LLC, Case No. 15-1945 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held in a 2-1 decision that filing proofs of claim on time-barred debts does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), at least where state law preserves the right to collect on the payment. In so holding, the court sided with the Second and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals in a circuit split regarding the viability of FDCPA claims premised on proofs of claim filed in a debtor’s bankruptcy case.

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered a decision in the General Motors bankruptcy case that found an exception to the “free and clear” language of Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code2 where adequate notice of the sale order is not provided.3 However, the exception may not be far reaching due to the “peculiar” facts of the case.

Factual Background and Lower Court Decision

Learning the interplay between state rules of judicial procedure and federal bankruptcy law can be a daunting undertaking, but the pitfalls of failing to do so can be severe. A recent example of the importance of being mindful of these issues is Hewett v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee, No. 2D15–1074, 2016 WL 3065014 (Fla. 2d DCA June 1, 2016) where the filing of a bankruptcy petition ultimately cost a foreclosure defendant his right to appeal a final judgment of foreclosure.

The Second DCA summarized the procedural posture of the case as follows:

Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion in In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.1 that permitted the debtor, Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation (“Sabine”) to reject certain gathering and condensation agreements as executory contracts under 11 U.S.C. § 365. Because the midstream service sector finances the construction of pipelines, the costs of which are recovered over the life of gathering agreements, the Court’s decision has the potential to lead to considerable upheaval in the energy sector.

In March 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that a landlord may be liable to a debtor’s bankruptcy estate for the value of a lease the debtor terminated early, holding the termination may be an “avoidable transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code.1 The opinion in Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. T.D. Invs. I, LLP (In re Great Lakes Quick Lube LP)2 reversed the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling, and in doing so perhaps expanded the definition of a “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Background