On March 27, 2020 both chambers of the German parliament passed emergency legislation to mitigate the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic encompassing, inter alia, a suspension of the obligation to file for insolvency, corresponding limitations of the management’s and lenders’ liability and introduction of a moratorium on certain contractual obligations.
As the nation hunkers down to combat the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), bankruptcy courts throughout the country have moved quickly to implement procedures to preserve access to the courts while limiting in-person interaction during the crisis. Each court’s specific COVID-19 procedures are different, but they largely prohibit in-person hearings, recognize the need for flexibility and adjournments for non-emergent matters whenever possible, and encourage the creative use of technology to allow as many matters to go forward as scheduled, including evidentiary hearings.
Social distancing. Elbow bumps. Flatten the curve. These are the new phrases and behaviors we have learned to avoid exposure to the novel coronavirus (COVID-19). This epic struggle forces us to reexamine and reevaluate our daily habits, lifestyles and customs as we work collectively to minimize the harm to our families, friends and neighbors throughout the United States.
On February 25, 2020, in Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, No. 18-1269 (U.S. 2020), the U.S. Supreme Court effectively ruled that the so-called “Bob Richards rule” should not be used to determine which member of a group of corporations filing a consolidated federal income tax return is entitled to a federal income tax refund.
On December 20, 2019, the honorable Marvin Isgur, judge of the Southern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court, issued an opinion holding that Alta Mesa Holdings (“Alta Mesa”), an upstream oil and gas producer with operations based in the STACK formation, could not, under Oklahoma law, reject certain gathering agreements in its bankruptcy case.1 The holding in Alta Mesa follows a similar outcome issued less than three months earlier in In re Badlands Energy, Inc.,2 a case decided by a Colorado bankruptcy court applying Utah law.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).
On July 24, 2019, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) issued the Consultation Paper on the Proposed Framework for Variable Capital Companies Part 3 (the Consultation Paper), which covers the proposed subsidiary legislation relating to the insolvency and winding up of a v
We’ve all heard it said a million times - if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. But does that age-old maxim apply to a bankrupt customer offering to pay you 100% of your unsecured claim through a “prepackaged” bankruptcy or under a critical vendor program? The answer can be complicated.
This article explores what it means to be “unimpaired” and paid in full in prepackaged bankruptcies and under critical vendor programs and outlines some of the potential pitfalls that can be faced by unsecured creditors under these scenarios.
We’ve all heard it said a million times - if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. But does that age-old maxim apply to a bankrupt customer offering to pay you 100% of your unsecured claim through a “prepackaged” bankruptcy or under a critical vendor program? The answer can be complicated.
This article explores what it means to be “unimpaired” and paid in full in prepackaged bankruptcies and under critical vendor programs and outlines some of the potential pitfalls that can be faced by unsecured creditors under these scenarios.
The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.