CGU Insurance Limited v Blakeley & Ors [2016] HCA 2

The High Court of Australia has held unanimously¹ that a person who commences proceedings against an insolvent company or a bankrupt individual can join that defendant’s insurer to the proceedings and seek a declaration that the insurer is liable to indemnify the defendant.

Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd & Anor v Whitton & Ors [2015] FCA 1169

A bankruptcy trustee’s notice objecting to discharge on one of the special grounds specified in the Bankruptcy Act 1966 can be valid even if based on additional unstated reasons, so long as those reasons are directed to the achievement of a purpose of the law of bankruptcy.

BH Apartments v Sutherland Nominees [2015] VSC 381

The costs of ‘convening’. Whether the person requesting a meeting of creditors, pursuant to 5.6.15(1)(b) of the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) be called is only liable for the costs of calling the meeting.

Sutherland Nominees Pty Ltd (Sutherland) was being administered pursuant to a deed of company arrangement under part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,¹ Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.

Bankruptcy Judge Christopher S. Sontchi recently ruled in the Energy Future Holdings case¹ that the debtor will not be required to pay the $431 million “make whole” demanded by bondholders upon the debtor’s early payment of the bonds.²

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

Di Cioccio v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Di Cioccio) [2015] FCAFC 30

Whether inconsistency between Div 4B of Pt VI, s 58(1)(b) in Div 4 of Pt IV and s 116 of Pt VI of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)

An appeal from the decision of Di Cioccio v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2014] FCA 782.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.

In In re Filene’s Basement, LLC,¹ the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware considered the rejection damages a landlord claimant was entitled to pursuant to Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code after the debtor rejected its lease as part of its reorganization plan.