In Garfield v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 15-527 (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2016), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined whether a debtor who has been discharged in a bankruptcy can sue in a district court under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), as opposed to seeking relief in the bankruptcy court.

In the case of Domistyle, Inc., 14-41463 (5th Cir. Dec. 29, 2015), the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit affirmed an order of the bankruptcy court requiring a secured creditor to reimburse the trustee for expenses paid to preserve real property subject to the creditor’s lien until the debtor’s eventual surrender of the property to the creditor.

The language of Bankruptcy Code § 501(a) is as broad as it is simple.

On November 23, 2015, in the first appellate decision of its kind, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed a bankruptcy court order to compel chapter 7 debtors to surrender real property by directing the debtors to cease all foreclosure defense. The decision in Failla v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Failla), case no. 15-80328, marks the first decision from a federal appellate court to address the question of whether a bankruptcy court may enter an order directing a debtor to cease defending a mortgage foreclosure suit pending in state court.

Individuals filing for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") generally do so to have their debts discharged and receive the proverbial "fresh start."2 The same, however, is not true for corporations.

In Jenkins v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.,^[1]the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama held that the filing of a proof of claim based on a time-barred debt cannot give rise to a claim for damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), reasoning that any such claim is precluded by the Bankruptcy Code’s comprehensive claims-allowance procedure.

Foreclosure defense and bankruptcy often go hand in hand, but sometimes it seems like the left hand doesn’t talk to the right. This has proven especially common with bankruptcy plans that propose to “surrender” real property encumbered by a mortgage. The term “surrender” is not defined in the bankruptcy code. As a result, lenders and borrowers often interpret the term differently. For example, most lenders interpret surrender to mean not defending a foreclosure.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,¹ Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.

Bankruptcy Judge Christopher S. Sontchi recently ruled in the Energy Future Holdings case¹ that the debtor will not be required to pay the $431 million “make whole” demanded by bondholders upon the debtor’s early payment of the bonds.²

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.