In re Big M, Inc., No. 13-10233 (DHS), 2013 WL 1681489 (Bankr. D.N.J. April 17, 2013). In Big M, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that the debtor’s privilege did not pass to the creditors’ committee, even though the creditors’ committee obtained authority to investigate certain of the debtor’s causes of action, because the committee was acting as a fiduciary to creditors as opposed to the debtor’s estate.
Few courts have construed the meaning of “repurchase agreement” as used in the Bankruptcy Code, so the recent HomeBanc1 case out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware is a must-read for “repo” counterparties. The principal issue in HomeBanc was whether several zero purchase price repo transactions under the parties’ contract for the sale and repurchase of mortgage-backed securities fell within the definition of a “repurchase agreement” in Section 101(47) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Upstream C Reorganization
In the late 20th century, the IRS made a combination of unrelated decisions resulting in a proliferation of upstream C reorganizations. First was the repeal of the Bausch & Lomb rule, meaning that the equity held by a parent corporation in its subsidiary could count as continuity of interest, thus allowing the liquidation of a subsidiary to be treated as an upstream C reorganization. Second, the invention of the check-the-box regulations made subsidiary liquidations (and hence upstream reorganizations) so much easier.
Under Section 436 of the Internal Revenue Code, a single employer defined benefit plan sponsored by a company in bankruptcy cannot pay any “prohibited payments” (e.g., lump sums, Social Security level income annuity payments) if the plan is less than 100% funded. In June 2012, the IRS issued proposed regulations permitting such a defined benefit plan to be amended to eliminate prohibited payment forms without violating the anti-cutback requirements of Internal Revenue Code Section 411(d)(6) if certain conditions are satisfied.
LTR 201240017 is the world’s longest letter ruling, 111 pages in PDF format. Not surprisingly, it is a Section 355 ruling. It was issued three-and-a-half months after the original submission, with those dates bridging Christmas and New Year’s Day. There were seven additional submissions from the taxpayer in the interim. The release of the ruling was delayed for a couple of months.
On July 25, 2012, the Third Circuit issued its decision in In re American Capital Equipment LLC and Skinner Engine Co., 688 F.3d 145 (3rd Cir. 2012), becoming the first circuit court to align itself with numerous district courts that have allowed bankruptcy courts to reject a Chapter 11 plan prior to a confirmation hearing.
On July 9, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC (“Sunbeam”). It is a landmark opinion for trademark licensees whose licenses are rejected in bankruptcy by trademark owners.
In Loop 76, LLC, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (the “BAP”) recently held that a bankruptcy court may consider whether a creditor received a third party source of payment (e.g., a guaranty) when determining whether that creditor’s claim is “substantially similar” to other claims for purposes of plan classification under 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). In re Loop 76, LLC, 465 B.R. 525 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).
The U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision on May 29, 2012, finding that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender’s objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral.1 See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166, 566 U.S. ___ (2012).
The two most recent decisions of the Supreme Court involving federal taxes illustrate how a conservative approach to statutory interpretation tends to prevail, but only with great effort, and changing constituencies.
Hall v. United States