On June 25, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) issued a memorandum decision in the Lehman Brothers SIPA proceeding¹ holding that claims asserted by certain repurchase agreement (“repo”) counterparties (the “Representative Claimants”) did not qualify for treatment as customer claims under SIPA.

When a court awards a judgment to a party, it might seem as though the process of recovery has concluded. The successful party expects to collect and return to business. Yet, in some cases, the collection of the award begins another dispute, which companies should anticipate. Because many judgment awards include a total for damages plus an amount for interest set at a certain percentage to accrue per annum from the payment due date, an additional dispute may arise over the collection of interest owed.

In In re East End Development, LLC, 2013 WL 1820182 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr.

The EU Court of Justice held that Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 (“Directive 2008/94”) applies to pension benefits under a supplementary pension scheme, regardless of the cause of the employer’s insolvency, and without taking into account state pension benefits. Directive 2008/94 provides that member states must protect the pension interests of retirees when an employer becomes insolvent.

The Ninth Circuit has joined the majority of Circuit Courts in holding that bankruptcy courts have the authority to recharacterize alleged debts as equity. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creds. v. Hancock Park Capital II, L.P. (In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc.), No. 11-56677, --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 1800000 (9th Cir. April 30, 2013). In doing so, the appellate court has explicitly reversed the contrary precedent of In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986).

In re Big M, Inc., No. 13-10233 (DHS), 2013 WL 1681489 (Bankr. D.N.J. April 17, 2013). In Big M, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that the debtor’s privilege did not pass to the creditors’ committee, even though the creditors’ committee obtained authority to investigate certain of the debtor’s causes of action, because the committee was acting as a fiduciary to creditors as opposed to the debtor’s estate.

Few courts have construed the meaning of “repurchase agreement” as used in the Bankruptcy Code, so the recent HomeBanc¹ case out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware is a must-read for “repo” counterparties. The principal issue in HomeBanc was whether several zero purchase price repo transactions under the parties’ contract for the sale and repurchase of mortgage-backed securities fell within the definition of a “repurchase agreement” in Section 101(47) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently denied a petition for writ of certiorari by United Healthcare Insurance Company (“UHC”), which had requested judicial review of a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, whose jurisdiction includes the State of Texas. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion had held that ERISA did not preempt state claims brought by Access Mediquip (“Access”), a medical device provider, against UHC for negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and violations of the Texas Insurance Code (see Access Mediquip L.L.C. v. UnitedHealthcare Insurance Co., No.

Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(10) provides that in order for a plan proponent to “cram down” - i.e., force acceptance of - a plan of reorganization on a dissenting class of creditors, at least one impaired class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. Because a plan is often not accepted by all classes entitled to vote, the ability to procure at least one impaired, accepting class in order to cram down a dissenting class is essential in achieving plan confirmation.

On January 31, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC¹ declined to designate the votes of parties to a post-petition restructuring support agreement (i.e., a lock-up agreement), instead confirming the Debtors’ Modified Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization (the “Plan”) based on the votes of such parties.