The Court of Appeal gave judgment today (15 November 2013) in favour of licensed insolvency practitioner Andrew Hosking (D), unanimously upholding a strike out judgment of Peter Smith J made on 22 February 2013.
Stephen Hunt, liquidator of Ovenden Colbert Printers Limited (“OCP”), had sued D and 8 other defendants. His claim against D was brought pursuant to sections 238 and 241 Insolvency Act 1986. He alleged that D had received or benefited from payments made by OCP which constituted transactions at an undervalue.
The Court of Appeal judgment in Crystal Palace FC Ltd v Kavanagh and others brings welcome news for administrators and businesses in administration. The Court of Appeal has overturned the EAT and held that the dismissals of some of the football club’s staff were made for an economic, technical or organisational (ETO) reason and so liability did not pass under TUPE to the new owners of the Club, making it easier for them to operate it as a going concern.
When a franchisee files for bankruptcy, a franchisor naturally has concerns over how the process will affect the parties’ relationship. Of particular concern is the possibility that the franchisor will be forced into a relationship with an unacceptable successor as a result of a bankruptcy judge’s decision to authorize assumption and assignment of the franchise agreement over the franchisor’s objection.
The Romanian government has adopted, by means of Government emergency ordinance no. 91, the Insolvency Code. The Code gathers and amends all pre-insolvency and insolvency provisions in Romanian legislation relating to companies, groups of companies, credit institutions, insurance and reinsurance companies, as well as cross-border insolvency proceedings. It will enter into force on October 25, 2013 and will also apply to already ongoing insolvency proceedings.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas has held that underlying claims that the insureds misused investment funds intended for the purchase of nonperforming mortgages did not allege negligent acts, errors, or omissions in performing “mortgage broker services” within the policy’s definition of “Insured Services.” Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Halo Asset Mgmt., LLC, 2013 WL 5416268 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2013).
Two recent cases (Torre Asset Funding Limited & anr v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWHC 2670 (Ch) and Grupo Hotelero Urvasco S.A. v Carey Value Added S.L.
The economic impact of forced budget cuts from the sequester and other government funding crises—ranging from a government shutdown to the federal debt limit—and congressional gridlock place disproportionate pressure on smaller- or second tier-government contractors. Business partners of a financially infirm contractor must prepare for when a contract business partner, co-venturer, or teaming partner falls over the fiscal cliff and files for bankruptcy protection. In this article, we will provide an over
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, applying Oklahoma law, has held that a bankruptcy or insolvency exclusion may bar coverage for the insured broker’s claim, where the broker’s actions were connected to the bankruptcy of its client’s former insurer. C.L. Frates & Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 2013 WL 4734093 (10th Cir. Sept. 4, 2013).
Applying Pennsylvania law, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has held that an insured’s failure to notify its insurer of a potential claim violated the notice provision of the policy. Pelagatti v. Minn. Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co., 2013 WL 3213796 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2013). In so doing, the court held that the insurer was not required to show that it was prejudiced by the late notice and that whether the insured’s failure to provide timely notice negates coverage is determined under a “hybrid subjective/objective test.”
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a lawsuit to recover avoidable preference payments must be filed prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Specifically, such lawsuits must be commenced before the later of 1. two years after the commencement of the case or 2. one year after the appointment or election of the first Trustee, provided that the two-year period has not already expired.