In our recent article, Jevic: Breathing New Life Into Priority Disputes, we discussed the then-pending motions for settlement and dismissal inIn re Constellation Enterprises LLC,et al.,16-bk- 11213 (CSS) (D. Del.). Constellation’s settlement motion proposed to transfer assets to the General Unsecured Creditor Trust over the claims of priority creditors and faced strong opposition in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., 137 S.
In our article, Jevic: The Supreme Court Gives Structure to Chapter 11 Structured Dismissal, we discussed the narrow holding of Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., 137 S. Ct. 973, 985 (2017) (“Jevic”), which prohibits non-consensual structured dismissals that violate the Bankruptcy Code’s priority principles.
On May 3, 2017, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (the “Oversight Board”), acting on behalf of the cash-strapped Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “Commonwealth”), filed for bankruptcy protection in the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The Commonwealth’s Title III Petition for Covered Territory or Covered Instrumentality (the “Petition”) was filed in accordance with Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”), codified at 48 U.S.C. § 2161, et seq.
Last year we reported (here) that Alberta’s Redwater Energy Corporation decision signaled good news for lenders and noteholders secured by Alberta O&G assets because the federal Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) prevailed over conflicting provisions in the provincial regulations promulgated by the Alberta Energy Regulator (“AER”).
Last year, we reported that Australia had proposed significant insolvency reforms that, in our view, are long overdue ("A Major Leap Forward for Australian Insolvency Laws").
On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court, in Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., confirmed that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit “priority skipping” in Chapter 11 structured dismissals. In doing so, the Court held that, although the Code does not explicitly provide what, if any, priority rules apply to the distribution of estate assets in a Chapter 11 structured dismissal, “[a] distribution scheme in connection with the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the . . .
Reversing the lower courts, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has today held that, under New York law (which governs 95% of all indentures), the early repayment of indenture notes in Chapter 11 is an optional redemption requiring the payment of make-whole notwithstanding the automatic acceleration of the notes due to the Chapter 11 filing. Delaware Trust Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holding Company LLC (In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.), Case No. 16-1251 (5th Cir. Nov. 17, 2016).
Prior to May 19, 2016, enforcing security against a financially-troubled O&G borrower in Alberta was a difficult proposition because the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) had promulgated regulations to the effect that it would not license acquirers of producing wells unless potential environmental liabilities for the costs of abandonment, remediation and reclamation for non-producing wells were covered, either by the acquirer assuming the liabilities or posting the necessary R&R bonding.
In Chan Siew Lee Jannie v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] SGCA 23, the Singapore Court of Appeal was faced with the issue of whether a statutory demand issued to a guarantor would be deemed defective and liable to be set aside if it did not include the details of a pledge given by the principal debtor.
In a recent decision Peh Yeng Yok v Tembusu Systems Pte Ltd (formerly known as Tembusu Terminals Pte Ltd) and others [2016] SGHC 36, Judicial Commissioner Chua Lee Ming, sitting in the High Court, elaborated on the standard required to justify a search order (also known as an Anton Piller order). The Court emphasised in particular, that the onus was on the party seeking the search order to show that there is a real possibility that the defendants will otherwise destroy documents that are relevant to the proceedings.