Judge Craig Whitley’s recent transfer of the LTL Management case will bring a high-profile "Texas Two-Step" chapter 11 bankruptcy to New Jersey, and it may open a new chapter in how courts approach the novel transaction designed to isolate and address certain mass-tort liabilities.

In a decision that will likely impact bankruptcy proceedings around the country, the Supreme Court recently denied the petition for writ of certiorari of David Hargreaves, which challenged the equitable mootness doctrine.¹ As a result, the concept of equitable mootness remains anything but moot.

Shortly after the passage of a bill injecting an additional $310 billion into the Small Business Administration’s Paycheck Protection Program, the SBA has issued another supplemental Interim Final Rule (IFR) providing new guidance on several issues, including eligibility for hedge funds, private equity firms and portfolio companies, and has also answered questions about businesses in bankruptcy proceedings.

On 13 June 2019, the much anticipated DIFC Insolvency Law No. 1 of 2019 and associated DIFC Insolvency Regulations 2019 (collectively the “2019 DIFC Insolvency Law”), came into full force and effect, replacing the DIFC Insolvency Law No. 3 of 2009.

By way of context, the 2019 DIFC Insolvency Law applies only to entities registered and operating within the DIFC.

Section 154 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) provides that a business rescue plan (BR plan) may provide that a creditor, who has acceded to the discharge of the whole or part of a debt owing to that creditor, will lose the right to enforce the debt or part of it. Furthermore, if a BR plan has been approved and implemented, a creditor is not entitled to enforce any debt owed by the company immediately before the beginning of the business rescue process, except to the extent provided for in the BR plan.

The legal principles relating to execution against movable property are more or less settled, less so the law relating to execution against immovable property. This is mainly because the right to housing is enshrined in s26 of the Constitution and the issue of land has become somewhat emotive and politicised in the recent past.

In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court settled a long-standing circuit split regarding the impact of bankruptcy filings on trademark licenses. Until May 20th, brand owners in some jurisdictions could use bankruptcy protections to terminate the rights of third parties to use its licensed trademarks. Now, it is clear that a bankrupt licensor cannot rescind trademark license rights. Licensees can continue to do whatever their trademark licenses authorize, even if the licensor has filed for bankruptcy.

In many, if not all, commercial transactions, timing is everything, either for a distressed seller or a purchaser stumbling upon a deal that may almost be too good to be true. There is often no time to waste and a deal must be closed as soon as possible. In the haste of closing a deal, whether in the form of a sale of business or a sale of assets, the parties often agree not to comply with the provisions of s34(1) of the Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936 (Act), each willing to take the risk in not doing so.

Section 34(1) of the Act provides that:

It is trite that the purpose of business rescue proceedings is to rehabilitate companies that have fallen on hard times, with a hope of either rescuing them or to provide a better return to creditors than what they would receive on a liquidation. This was reiterated in the recent Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) judgment of Van Staden and Others NNO v Pro-Wiz (Pty) Ltd (412/2018) [2019] ZASCA 7 (8 March 2019).

The Bill aims to amend, among others, the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Insolvency Act) to provide that secured creditors holding property pledged as security for the obligations of a South African party arising under a “master agreement” may: