Close to ten years have passed since the filing of the chapter 11 cases of Tulsa, Oklahoma-based SemCrude L.P., but this week, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a 2015 district court ruling that resolved a dispute between oil producers and downstream purchasers over the perfection and priority of interests in oil sold by SemCrude L.P. and its affiliates. The Third Circuit’s holding in In re SemCrude L.P., --- F.3d ---, 2017 WL 3045889 (3d Cir.

The limitations of set-off in a liquidation scenario and the nature and effect of a security interest under the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (PPSA) have been clarified, with significant ramifications for principals and financiers, who should now review their rights, following the WA Supreme Court's decision in Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2017] WASC 152 (Clayton Utz acted for the successful receivers).

Safe harbour and ipso facto clauses reforms are closer, with the consultation on the Insolvency Laws Amendment Bill 2017 having closed last week, but further work is needed.

The Federal Government's consultation on the safe harbour and ipso facto reforms in the draft Insolvency Laws Amendment Bill 2017 closed on 17 May 2017, so we now have a better idea of what they will look like.

In our recent article, Jevic: Breathing New Life Into Priority Disputes, we discussed the then-pending motions for settlement and dismissal inIn re Constellation Enterprises LLC,et al.,16-bk- 11213 (CSS) (D. Del.). Constellation’s settlement motion proposed to transfer assets to the General Unsecured Creditor Trust over the claims of priority creditors and faced strong opposition in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., 137 S.

In our article, Jevic: The Supreme Court Gives Structure to Chapter 11 Structured Dismissal, we discussed the narrow holding of Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., 137 S. Ct. 973, 985 (2017) (“Jevic”), which prohibits non-consensual structured dismissals that violate the Bankruptcy Code’s priority principles.

On May 3, 2017, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (the “Oversight Board”), acting on behalf of the cash-strapped Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “Commonwealth”), filed for bankruptcy protection in the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The Commonwealth’s Title III Petition for Covered Territory or Covered Instrumentality (the “Petition”) was filed in accordance with Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”), codified at 48 U.S.C. § 2161, et seq.

Last year we reported (here) that Alberta’s Redwater Energy Corporation decision signaled good news for lenders and noteholders secured by Alberta O&G assets because the federal Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) prevailed over conflicting provisions in the provincial regulations promulgated by the Alberta Energy Regulator (“AER”).

Last year, we reported that Australia had proposed significant insolvency reforms that, in our view, are long overdue ("A Major Leap Forward for Australian Insolvency Laws").

Assets held by an insolvent corporate trustee in its capacity as trustee may not be "property of the company".

For more than 30 years, Victoria has stood apart from the rest of Australia in how it treats the assets of an insolvent corporate trustee. That may have changed, following the Supreme Court's decision in Re Amerind Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) (in liq) [2017] VSC 127.

On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court, in Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., confirmed that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit “priority skipping” in Chapter 11 structured dismissals. In doing so, the Court held that, although the Code does not explicitly provide what, if any, priority rules apply to the distribution of estate assets in a Chapter 11 structured dismissal, “[a] distribution scheme in connection with the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the . . .