On January 17, 2019, the Fifth Circuit held that a creditor is not impaired for the purpose of voting on a plan if it is the Bankruptcy Code (as opposed to plan treatment) that impairs a creditor’s claim. The court further held that a make-whole premium is a claim for unmatured interest which is not an allowable claim under Bankruptcy Code, absent application of the “solvent-debtor” exception which may or not apply—the issue was remanded to the bankruptcy court for decision.

On January 15th, 2019, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the end user of an electricity forward contact was not entitled to the benefits of the safe harbor provisions under Section 556 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 556 allows a “forward contract merchant” to terminate a forward contract post-petition based on an ipso facto clause in the contract and exempts such actions from the automatic stay.

A trustee in bankruptcy lost all rights to the proceeds of sale of a freehold property after he disclaimed title to it

Background

Mr Sleight was the trustee in bankruptcy of an insolvent estate. The deceased’s assets included several freehold properties that were charged to banks where the value of the property was less than the amounts due under the charges. Given the negative equity, the trustee in bankruptcy disclaimed title to these properties as they constituted “onerous property”.

Pensions New (PN) has often had cause to ask himself what he knows.  A similar sort of question was frequently posed by the French essayist, Michel de Montaigne.  Montaigne lived between 1533 and 1592 and he answered this question over the course of a period of time during which he produced several volumes of great essays.  In those volumes, Montaigne covered many subjects however he never covered the subject of the occupational defined benefit pension scheme.  So far PN knows, this is the first article ever written about Montaigne’s relationshi

On 31 October 2018 the Supreme Court issued its Judgment in the appeal of Dooneen Ltd (t/a McGinness Associates) and another (Respondents) v Mond (Appellant) (Scotland) [2018] UKSC 54.

The appeal had been brought by Mr Mond who had sought to overturn the decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session (Dooneen Ltd & Others V Mond [2016] CSIH 59).

Factual background

The Eleventh Circuit recently found in favor of Blue Bell Creameries, Inc. by rejecting its own earlier dicta and explicitly expanding the preference payment defense known as “new value.” This provides additional protection for companies doing business with a debtor in the 90 days prior to bankruptcy.

THE SCOOP: BRUNO’S V. BLUE BELL

On May 22, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Franchise Services of North America v. United States Trustees (In re Franchise Services of North America), 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 13332 (5th Cir. May 22, 2018). That decision affirms the lower court’s holding that a “golden share” is valid and necessary to filing when held by a true investor, even if such investor is controlled by a creditor.

Following the liquidation of BHS Ltd, the High Court was asked to consider whether a landlord could claim full rent as an administration expense following termination of the CVA.

Background

Wright and another (Liquidators of SHB Realisations Ltd) v The Prudential Assurance Company Ltd concerned three principal insolvency processes applicable to companies under the Insolvency Act 1986:

The Court of Appeal has held that refusal of consent for both good and bad reasons will not automatically render that refusal unreasonable.

Background

Most commercial leases require tenants to obtain the consent of their landlord prior to assigning their lease. If so, the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988 (the Act) applies to say that if the tenant serves a valid application for consent, the landlord will be subject to the following duties:

The Circuit Courts of Appeal have split on whether a prepetition transfer made by a debtor is avoidable if the transfer was made through a financial intermediary that was a mere conduit. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously resolved the split by deciding that transfers through “mere conduits” are not protected. This is a major (and adverse) decision for lenders, bondholders and noteholders who receive payments through an intermediary such as a disbursing agent.